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ABSTRACT 
 
ELISABETH A. MOSS: “Enough and As Good”? 
What Liberals Owe the World’s Destitute 
 
 
  John Locke, champion of individual liberty and most important classical liberal, 
sought first to free men from tyranny.  But liberalism at its roots, and ultimate hegemony in modern 
era of neoliberalism, emphasizes personal property rights.  Ownership of one’s labor, according to 
Locke, entitles one to all he mixes it with, provided there is “enough and as good, left in common for 
others.”  The disturbing facts about life in this world, the poverty and gross disparity in quality of life, 
indicate the failure of the liberal’s own project.  This topic is all the more crucial in light of the 
contemporary surge in libertarianism, likewise based upon conservative economics and protection of 
personal property.  An alternative view of liberty allows one to see that poverty and destitution 
represent acute curtailment of the most fundamental of liberties. 
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PREFACE 
 
 
 The statistics are staggering.  The United Nations Development Programme reports that 1.2 
billion of the world’s people are subsisting on less than $1 a day (in 1993 PPP $US)(UNDP 2000 4).   
In 1997, the world’s richest quintile made off with 86 percent of the world’s GDP, while the bottom 
20 percent made do with a mere one percent.   “The world’s 200 richest people more than doubled 
their net worth in the four years to 1998, to more than $1 trillion.  The assets of the top three 
billionaires are more than the combined GNP of all least developed countries and their 600 million 
people" (UNDP 1999, 2,3).  While 30 countries had a per capita food supply from 10 to well over 50 
percent above nutritional requirements, the people in 20 countries were left with a supply from 10 to 
30 percent below those requirements (Sivard 1996, 30-31).  In the developing world, according to 
1998 figures, 14.3 percent of the population is not expected to reach the age of forty.  Over 27 percent 
are illiterate.  Fifty-six percent are without access to sanitation, and 28 percent have no safe water 
supplies (UNDP 2000 171). 
These facts of our world “are morally problematic—which is to say that they disturb our 
sense of what ought to be” (Care 14).  And indeed, destitution and gross disparity need not exist in 
our world; these are for the most part of social and not natural origin, a matter of skewed distribution 
and not a natural order of things.  Yet our moral emotions are likely to be somewhat mixed.  Sorrow 
is certainly a natural and appropriate response to the unnecessary suffering of others.  Sorrow may 
indicate the presence of what utilitarians call “natural sympathy,” but in itself sorrow does little to 
motivate one toward positive action.  In fact, “a common prescription for relief from sorrow is a 
change of topic, a re-directing of attention” (Care 22). 
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Another likely reaction is guilt, and unlike sadness, this emotion is reflected inwardly.  Care 
writes: 
As someone who more or less fits the characterization of the reasonably well-off 
individual in one of the world’s affluent societies, the facts in question make me 
sharply self-conscious about my level of life.  When I think of them, I become 
suspicious of the legitimacy of my efforts to secure my interests and my efforts to 
develop my talents as I see them.  How can I be in life for myself . . . when the 
situation in the world community is what it is? (Care 22-3) 
 
If this type of self-analysis continues, this train of thought may carry one in a different 
direction, toward indignation.  “After all (let us assume), I did not cause anyone to be destitute.  I 
more or less found the world the way it is, and I did not make it be the way I found it” (Care 23).  
This emotion is unlikely to inspire one to alter one’s choices or affect the status quo, as we will insist 
that our actions do not contribute to suffering in this world.  “I am an innocent party to a world I did 
not create.  And I have but one life to live” (Care 23). 
But perhaps our innocence is yet another unwarranted assumption made on the part of the 
affluent.  For Michael Harrington it is a “cruel innocence which prevents us from even seeing the 
wrongs we perpetrate.”  He minces no words, asserting in the first line of The Vast Majority: A 
Journey to the World’s Poor, that “the government and the people of the United States are turning 
their backs on the wretched of the earth” (Harrington 13).  But this is no inflammatory anti-
Americanism, which one sometimes hears from the Left.  “I do not propose a theory of American 
malevolence.  Rather, I will show how the United States is normally an unconscious participant in, 
and beneficiary of, a global system of injustice that warps or destroys the minds and bodies of 
hundreds of millions of human beings” (Harrington 14). 
Harrington is quite willing to count himself as one who is torn by a mixture of emotions in 
response to global suffering.  The book contains journal entries written during a trip to India, where 
Harrington admits “I too grew tired of, and even angry at, the continual wheedling of leprous 
beggars” (Harrington 14).   
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Yet Harrington permits himself to hope.  “We are a decent people.  But intricate economic 
mechanisms, whose very existence is a mystery to most citizens, subvert that innate generosity and 
perpetuate misery around the globe.  And yet, if this nation would become aware of the unwitting evil 
it does, and if there were a democratic movement capable of offering serious alternatives to it, then it 
could, and would, change” (Harrington 13).  But the complexity of our moral emotional response 
requires that one take care in bringing about this awareness.  “Let one family or town suffer some 
terrible fate and the good heart of this country—I write here utterly without irony—will pour forth in 
gifts and concern.  Let a billion men and women rot day after day, and the very enormity of that 
reality tends to dull the moral sense” (Harrington 14).  The “desire to shock the affluent public into a 
crusade to avert an impending calamity,” no matter what sense of decency inspired it, is likely to 
provoke the opposite response, spurring the public only to resignation. 
How must the problem be framed in order to affect the consciousness of the affluent public?  
What is it that the citizens and leaders of the developed world need to realize in order to affect the 
necessary changes in the global order?  According to the status quo, what we in liberal societies owe 
others is forbearance. We are not to harm them or their prospects, but we do not owe them our help. 
Such an obligation would be an intolerable constraint upon individual liberty, which is prized above 
all else.  
 But this is not to say that nothing is being done on behalf of good and well-meaning people of 
the world to assist their suffering neighbors.  Indeed, gifts and aid flow from affluent countries, via 
hundreds of nongovernmental organizations, to people in need all over the globe.  Volunteerism and 
charity are rewarded by the civic and economic institutions of affluent liberal countries, and 
community and religious organizations attempt to foster a “good neighbor” ethic among citizens.  But 
it is an unfortunate fact that the liberal response to poverty and destitution relies almost exclusively 
on the kindness of strangers, so to speak, by encouraging the expression of natural sympathy through 
social (nongovernmental) outlets in the private sector.   
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The richest person in the world has attempted to set an example of the compassionate 
capitalist, and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has donated millions of dollars in grants to fund 
public primary health and education services in many of the world’s poorest countries.  I do not wish 
to question Mr. Gates’ compassion; his heart is in the right place, as are the principles guiding his 
efforts.  Indeed, I admire the Foundation’s approach to the alleviation of poverty’s most gruesome 
features, starvation and malnutrition, preventable illnesses like malaria and AIDS, and illiteracy.  
Nevertheless, I cannot help but be troubled by the incongruous picture, for his generosity does not 
offset the gross imbalance of his share of the world’s wealth, a figure roughly the equivalent of the 
combined GDPs of ten least developed countries (Liberia, Guyana, Sierra Leone, Eritrea, Mongolia, 
Rwanda, Gabon, Somalia, Burundi, and Suriname) or three struggling economies in Latin America 
and the Caribbean (Nicaragua, Honduras, and Jamaica) (www.wallstreetview.com).  According to the 
Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s 2002 Annual Report, $506,984,000 in grants was spent on 
global health.  Even if this contribution came directly out of Bill Gates’ pocket—it didn’t, of course, 
as most of the foundation’s assets are in the form of investments—that figure would represent about 
1/80 of his total wealth.  A proportionate gift of charity from my own modest wealth would come to 
about $200.   
It is not my intention to draft my critique against the relative strength or weakness of the 
natural sympathies of the affluent.  My point is not that Americans are selfish.  I would agree with 
Michael Harrington, the eminent social critic, in applauding the spirit with which Americans come to 
the aid of their fellows.  But as I’ve described, the moral reaction to global-scale poverty and 
destitution tends to be rather complex.  There is a disconnect, more experiential than logical, in our 
coming to terms with the suffering of the destitute.  
The material struggles we in affluent nations find ourselves in are not the results of material 
deprivation but rather problems generated by having so much in the way of material goods. And as 
we in affluent nations struggle to accumulate and maintain more and more stuff, the further removed 
we become from a notion of real deprivation.  It is this disconnect which I will endeavor to highlight 
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as it appears in liberal policies and institutions, as well as the liberal theory which informs them.  Yet 
I maintain that these dangerous assumptions can be dispelled with due attention to what liberty 
actually means in person’s lives.  With some modification of the liberal conception of liberty, it is 
hoped that liberal theory and practice could be brought more in line with essential liberal values and 
thus more compatible with the realization of international human rights. 
Many Americans may respond to my critique by pointing to the various safety nets and social 
insurance schemes collectively known as the welfare state.  And in addition to this national response 
to poverty, one may wish to point out, the United States has largely provided the impetus and funding 
for international ameliorative efforts.  This response, for reasons that I hope to make clear, chimes 
with Ebeneezer Scrooge’s infamous retort when confronted with the prospects of the destitute:  “Are 
there no workhouses?”  I intend to show that the liberal response to the world’s destitute, exemplified 
by its welfare state and international agencies, is marked by the recognition of negative rights, among 
which are civil and political rights to protect life  and liberty, and private property rights.  Thus the 
liberal favors democratic, free-market policies and institutions.  The following section on current 
ameliorative efforts will show these to be indicative of the liberal’s allegiance to free market 
capitalism.  Yet the liberal commitment to unlimited accumulation of wealth, as exhibited not only in 
its classical theoretical foundation but in contemporary development strategy as well, has had 
detrimental effects on the liberal commitment to liberty.  Thus a central question will be:  Why 
doesn’t the liberal conceive poverty as an intolerable restriction of liberty?  The answers generated in 
this inquiry will highlight critical assumptions made in liberal theory which hinder the liberal’s own 
project.  These are evident in the failures of liberal development strategy, partly due to a narrowing of 
the goal of development.  But even beyond the liberal’s exclusive emphasis on the goal of economic 
growth, development policy is informed by a tradition of economic theory which assumes an inherent 
trade-off with respect to the growth in capital accumulation and the redistribution of resources.   
The following section will examine liberal attempts to address the problem of poverty and 
destitution.  It is accepted here, as it is in international economic policy (and has been for decades), 
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that we agree that something must be done.  I will not devote extensive argument to why something 
must be done, though I hope that fact will be made clear.  Rather, I will accept the liberal’s intrinsic 
project as my own, which I take to be the protection and enhancement of the liberty to pursue a life of 
personal meaning and significance.  I intend to take the liberal to task on his own ground, taking 
liberal values of liberty and equality very seriously in my critique of the liberal response to the 
world’s destitute.  Thus the success or failure of liberal economic policy will be measured in the 
liberal’s own terms.   
The liberal response to the world’s destitute includes the creation of international financial 
institutions, most importantly the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  Strategies 
sponsored and funded by these institutions are founded upon a particularly conservative reading of 
classical liberal theory and have become known as “neoliberal reform.”  Thus the second and third 
sections will place these development strategies within the context of first classical liberal economy 
and then classical liberal political theory.  Section two will concentrate on the alleged trade-off 
between economic growth and redistribution which underlies a long history of economic theory and 
policy.  Section three will examine the theoretical foundations for this emphasis on accumulation.  
Liberal rights to private property will be set within the larger liberal scheme of protecting liberty. 
The classical conception of liberty, which still provides the foundation for current liberal economic 
policy, is crucial to my project, for I intend to show that it is incomplete, if not incoherent.  It is this 
flaw in liberal theory which hampers the liberal in his attempts to guarantee human rights to all 
individuals.  Thus sections to follow will contrast the liberal’s negative conception of liberty with 
positive liberty, or liberty as capability, in Amartya Sen’s terms.  This positive conception is not only 
more in line with the primary end of development—improving the lives of persons, not increasing 
GDP growth—but also more compatible with the liberal’s own project—that of enhancing persons’ 
freedom to pursue meaningful lives.  The final section will sketch out some of the practical 
ramifications of this proposed modification to liberal theory.  Of special interest, since it may provide 
resolution for the alleged trade-off between economic growth and redistribution, is the accumulation 
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of human capital.  Expenditure on human capital—that is, spending on health and education 
programs—promotes the primary end of development by improving the lives of people.  But it may 
also be an effective means to increasing economic growth by enhancing the productive capabilities of 
the labor force and its social support. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE LIBERAL RESPONSE TO THE WORLD’S POOR 
 
 
An objection might be made out the outset, and it is important enough to mention here.  
According to Jack Donnelly, my characterization of liberalism, like that of so many of its critics, is 
minimalistic to the point of inaccuracy, projecting a description that is “partial and seriously 
distorted” (Donnelly 88).  Yet while he traces the roots of liberalism to Locke, and especially his 
Second Treatise (88-89), he later rebukes the critics of liberalism for taking this to be sacred dogma 
(103).  This appears to be a sort of back-up plan, in case he cannot convince us that positive economic 
rights are to be found in Locke’s Second Treatise, for ultimately Donnelly advocates a “radical or 
social democratic” version of liberalism (106).  Now it is not my intention to argue against this 
radical strand, for in this respect our projects reflect similar arguments for the recognition of positive 
social rights.  I do wish to make clear, however, the stark contrasts between the liberal and the social 
democratic welfare states.  This is important not just because the former seeks to avoid universal 
positive rights, but also because it appears that even the European social democratic welfare state is 
currently undergoing rollbacks.  
Enhancement of the welfare of persons may come from a variety of source, including the 
labor market, through which employers provide wage income as well as sickness, injury and 
retirement benefits; private insurance and personal savings; and voluntary charity (Barr 6). Although 
these sources of individual welfare are not to be discounted, they are not sufficient to protect all 
vulnerable persons in a laissez faire economy. Thus certain obligations must be taken up by the state.  
Gøsta Esping-Andersen has done much to further our understanding of welfare state regimes, 
and the portrait he paints is stratified by class (especially working class) mobilization and political 
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coalitions, resulting in three different versions of the welfare state: liberal, corporatist, and social 
democratic.  The criterion which distinguishes these three types is the degree to which entitlements 
represent decommodification, or the ability to maintain a living without reliance upon the market.  
Esping-Andersen writes: “If social rights are given the legal and practical status of property rights, if 
they are inviolable, and if they are granted on the basis of citizenship rather than performance, they 
will entail a decommodification of the status of individuals vis-à-vis the market” (Esping-Andersen 
21).  Decommodification is operationalized using three dimensions of measurement.  The first seeks 
to measure individuals’ access to benefits according to rules and restrictions of entitlements.  The 
second dimension measures the level of income replacement, and the third quantifies the range of 
entitlements (Esping-Andersen 47).   
The results of Esping-Andersen’s test are anticipated by my characterization of liberalism.  In 
each of the three dimensions, liberal welfare state regimes, the Anglo-Saxon version found in the 
United States, Britain, and Australia, earn the lowest scores, making them the least decommodified.  
The portrait which results is indeed one of a minimally-obligated state relying on the market to 
reward “self reliance and industriousness” (Esping-Andersen 42).  On the first dimension, the liberal 
state seeks to restrict entry to and speed the exit from entitlements.  With roots in the poor-law 
tradition, liberal entitlements are awarded on the basis of “demonstrable and abject need,” as 
demonstrated in means- and income-tests (Esping-Andersen 48).  The level of income replacement, 
the second dimension, is significantly below normal earnings and the standard of living, meaning that 
recipients are driven back to work as quickly as possible.  And thirdly, the range of entitlements is the 
lowest in liberal welfare states.  While Scandinavians have considered a guaranteed citizen’s wage, 
liberal regimes seek to limit benefits to protection against risk or crisis, such as sickness, disability, 
and old age (Esping-Andersen 47).  While social democratic welfare states have sought to guarantee 
universal social rights, without regard to need or cause, their liberal counterparts have only reluctantly 
constructed safety nets where there is urgent need or, in many cases, working class pressure.  Thus 
the American social insurance scheme is less a victory for social rights than a more contractual, 
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restricted entitlement package.  “The idea here is that the United States could be spared the 
‘socialistic’ flavor of state social insurance by encouraging company-based welfare schemes” 
(Esping-Andersen 42).   
 Since the 1980s, there have been grave prophesies foretelling of the doomsday of the welfare 
state, especially the more generous versions.  And indeed, the welfare state has faced increasing 
pressures, both from within, in the graying of the population, combined with rising unemployment, 
and from without, as the “sea change” in the global economic environment has constrained the 
options available to national governments. Much has been made in the contemporary literature of the 
changing economic environment, beginning in 1971 with the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of 
fixed exchange rates and further destabilized by the 1973 oil shocks.  These events, as well as the 
increased internationalization of trade, capital, and financial and currency markets, in addition to the 
shift from industrial sector to service sector employment, have greatly reduced nations’ efficacy in 
fiscal matters (Stephens, Huber and Ray 165).  Yet despite these enormous pressures faced by welfare 
states, equal attention has been given to the political pressures which have shored up their resiliency.  
It is in this sense that one would expect those more universalist welfare state programs to fare better 
than excessively targeted programs, whose beneficiaries are fewer and, since they are most likely in 
the lower classes, less capable of the necessary political mobilization.  It has also been pointed out 
that although the supply-side policies of the social democratic welfare states were increasingly more 
difficult (Stephens, Huber and Ray 166), these welfare states were also better able to manage labor 
force participation through policies encouraging women’s participation and expansion of public 
sector employment (Huber and Stephens 15).   
 While there is disagreement over the extent of welfare state retrenchment, with some 
proclaiming that globalization of capital and trade have made generous welfare states uncompetitive 
and therefore unviable and others insisting that rollbacks merely constitute slowed increase in social 
expenditure (Huber and Stephens 11, 9), there is no doubt that the welfare state is in “hard times” 
(Stephens, Huber and Ray 164).  For even if the rollbacks represent reduced increase rather than 
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wholesale dismantling of universalist social policy, the relevant question is whether expenditure kept 
up with increases in claimants due to aging and unemployment (Stephens, Huber and Ray 173).  Data 
from the Luxembourg Income Study indicate that poverty, measured as the percentage of the 
population in households having less than 40 percent of median household income, as well as the 
percentage of the population receiving means-tested social assistance, increased in most OECD 
countries between 1980 and 1991 (Clayton and Pontusson 75).   
Stephens, Huber and Ray argue that entitlements of the Scandinavian welfare states are not 
contributing to their economic difficulties but quite the reverse, as many of them represent investment 
in human capital, resulting in comparative advantages (Stephens, Huber and Ray 179).  These authors 
thus conclude that  
by international standards, these are still and will continue to be very generous 
welfare states.  Despite the introduction of waiting days and probable cuts of 
replacement rates in unemployment, work injury, sick pay, and parental leave from 
90 to 100 percent to about 75 percent . . . , they still fit the institutional model 
(Stephens, Huber and Ray 181).   
 
But other authors point out that these cuts, especially in public social services, reflect 
significant reduction in universal provision.  Clayton and Pontusson claim that “in large measure, the 
universalism that distinguished the Swedish welfare state in the 1970s and 1980s derived from the 
universalism of employment in Sweden.”  Since employment rates from both men and women were 
so much higher than in other OECD countries, most of the population was able to take advantage of 
all benefits, both those available to all citizens and those tied to employment.  But in the 1990s 
“Sweden’s nonworking population of working age nearly doubled; this represents a major increase in 
the number of people with only limited access to universalistic social programs” (Clayton and 
Pontusson 77).   
Stephens, Huber and Ray insist that retrenchment has not resulted in a convergence on the 
residualist liberal welfare state model.  Only two countries, the United Kingdom and New Zealand, 
have shifted from universal income security toward the liberal typology distinguished by  means-
tested assistance (Stephens, Huber and Ray 184, 191).  Nevertheless, as these authors are interested in 
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partisan differences in welfare state policy, they do recognize the ascendancy of neoliberalism:  
“Given this importance of beliefs about the consequences of different policies, one must assume that 
the rise in the international hegemony of neoliberal economics contributed to the tendency of 
retrenchment in state expenditures and direct involvement in social policy” (Stephens, Huber and Ray 
168).  Thus they conclude their analysis with a note of caution:  “. . . small to moderate cuts, changes 
in indexing, small shifts toward more means testing, and the like may over the long run erode the 
foundations of existing welfare state regimes and transform them in the direction of residual regimes” 
(Stephens, Huber and Ray 191). 
These pressures exerted on the welfare states of advanced capitalist nations indicate not only 
the pervasive impact of economic crises in the 1970s and 1980s, but also the extent to which national 
governments have struggled to define their social obligations.  And while the burdens of recognizing 
universal positive social and economic rights may prove to be a heavy one, especially in the midst of 
an uncertain global economic environment, there is reason to view neoliberal attempts to lighten this 
burden as the shirking of recognized responsibilities.  At the international level, member states to the 
United Nations have affirmed their commitment to the positive and negative rights embodied in 
universal human rights.  Yet in international development policy, these promises ring hollow, if 
indeed they are mentioned at all. 
 Article I of the United Nations Charter makes reference to its role as the champion of human 
rights, and one of its very first duties was the drafting and adoption of a Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  Adopted by the General Assembly on December 10, 1948, the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights marked consensus on the part of 48 of the Assembly’s then 58 members (with 2 
absences and 8 abstentions) on the necessity of protecting essential human rights 
(www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm). Not only were human rights recognized as priorities in the 
interest of global peace; they are also moral ends in themselves, being formal expressions of the 
inherent dignity of persons.  Thus Article 22 of the Universal Declaration states: 
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Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to 
the realization, through national effort and international cooperation and in 
accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the economic, social 
and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his 
personality (www.un.org). 
 
 These rights are explicitly universal and unconditional, existing regardless of the political will 
to recognize them.  “These are inherent rights to be enjoyed by all human beings of the global 
village—men, women and children, as well as by any group of society, disadvantaged or not—and 
not ‘gifts’ to be withdrawn, withheld or granted at someone’s whim or will” 
(www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm).  Human rights are both negative, outlining what cannot be 
done to individuals by governments (forbidding torture, for example, and arrest or prosecution 
without due process), and positive, expressing the necessary inputs for individual well-being (among 
them food, housing, medical care, education and employment) as things which are owed persons by 
nature of their inviolable moral status.  The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
states that “[a]round the world, millions of people are still denied food, shelter, access to medical 
care, education and work, and too many live in extreme poverty.  Their inherent humanity and dignity 
are not recognized” (www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carts.htm).  
Although the Declaration itself contains no coercive power, two legally binding treaties arose 
out of its adoption, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Yet despite the explicit positive economic and 
social rights recognized by the former, the international institutions primarily responsible for 
development planning and policy favor free market solutions to resource allocation problems.   These 
agencies are the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, created in 1944 at the 
Bretton Woods conference as a response to the financial “anarchy” of the 1930s, characterized by 
competitive currency devaluations and protectionist trade policies (Bird 1-2).  Providing a key 
articulation of the liberal faith in the free market to resolve issues of unemployment and shrinking 
world trade and, most importantly, encourage the global growth of wealth, the IMF was meant to 
institute an international monetary order.  The United States provided the primary inspiration, as the 
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more conservative US plan presented by Harry Dexter White effectively won out over the British 
Keynesian plan, and the US dollar was to be the linchpin of the pegged currency values (Bird 2). 
 The Fund, according to White’s plan, would function as stabilization, utilizing a measure of 
coercion to coordinate macroeconomic policy and providing short-to-medium term assistance to 
cover balance of payment deficits (Bird 2-3). Two essential features are crucial to understanding why 
the Bretton Woods institutions do not reflect the principles of universal positive economic rights put 
forward in the Declaration of Human Rights.  First, benefits provided by these agencies are 
conditional.  Initially, lending was not conditional but became so in the 1950s with the increasing fear 
in the United States over its obligation to underwrite the Fund’s operations (Bird 2).  Now lending is 
conditional not only upon demonstrated need, but also policy compliance.  During the 1980s and 
1990s, “selective conditionality” attached importance to the recipients’ ability to implement and 
sustain the required reforms.  By now most of the international community agrees that conditional aid 
does not work.  “This is true in the sense that attaching conditions to aid will not ensure that 
governments will undertake reforms they would not have chosen willingly.  Furthermore, if 
governments are willing to undertake the reforms then conditionality is unnecessary and may even be 
damaging” (Morrissey 18).  Thus current thinking by the international financial institutions instead 
advocates “conditional selectivity” or pre-selection based on countries’ success in implementing 
reform.  The World Bank’s argument is that aid itself is ineffective in sustaining economic growth, 
except in countries with “good policy” (Morrissey 18).   
Sylvanus Ikhide, writing for the United Nations University/WIDER, proclaims,  
 
There is no longer any doubt about the role of external development financial 
assistance in the economic performance of recipient countries where such assistance 
is undertaken in a conducive economic policy environment. . . . Good governance, 
well-managed public finances, a dynamic private sector, access to finance by all 
segments of the population, including small- and medium-scale enterprises, and 
adequate skills are undeniably components of the domestic resource environment that 
should foster resource mobilization (Ikhide 1). 
 
This portrait of the recipient countries presents them as favorable investment opportunities rather than 
countries struggling under heavy burdens to meet their public duties with limited resources.  And, in a 
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sense, that is indeed what they are taken to be.  Conventional economic wisdom is built around the 
expectation of the rewards of macroeconomic stability, which is conceived as a global public good 
(Ikhide 2).  Peter Gibbon and Lau Schulpen find that country selection for multilateral donors has 
been on unabashedly commercial grounds.  The leading recipients of IFC commitments (as well as 
the Inter-American Development Bank) have been Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, despite their 
shortcomings in macroeconomic stability.  “It is clear that these destinations were considered 
attractive both by private investors and by multilateral agencies on the grounds of potential short-term 
profitability deriving from the size of their markets alone” (Gibbon and Schulpen 18).  And just as 
conditional selectivity bends to accommodate opportunities for enhanced profit, agreements made by 
the World Trade Organization, by which developing countries are strictly bound, bends to the 
developed countries’ interest in profit as well (Gibbon and Schulpen 3).   
 Reinforcing the liberal minimalization of the state, there appears to be consensus at the 
international level on the role of the private sector as the engine of economic growth.  It is claimed 
that in addition to generating employment and income in communities, the private sector encourages 
participatory development.  Privatization is thought to address poverty reduction in its social 
dimension by diverting funds from inefficient public enterprises to education and health.  The 
complementary roles of the state and the private sector are given near paradigmatic status, dating 
from the 1991 World Bank World Development Report “which argued that while the role of private 
firms and markets was to produce and distribute goods and services in an efficient manner, 
government was needed in order to provide a legal and regulatory framework (including strengthened 
property rights), macroeconomic stability, investments in infrastructure and essential services for the 
poor” (Gibbon and Schulpen 1-2).  The World Bank reports that about two-thirds of all its operations 
since the early 1990s have explicitly addressed private sector development (Jimoh 3). 
 The neoliberal response to the inefficiencies of existing social sectors is privatization and 
decentralization.  Indeed, the rules are so deeply ingrained that the response is automatic.  And as one 
looks at the model currently being advocated, it appears that the praise it receives is not entirely 
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justified by its performance.  Introduced in Latin America, and now increasingly a part of loan and 
aid packages offered to developing countries elsewhere, social funds are viewed by liberals as the 
answer to social reform.  Essentially designed to relieve unemployment and poverty by involving 
local actors in the design and construction of social service projects like wells and health clinics, 
social funds are decentralized, partly-privatized, demand-driven, participatory, and low in cost—all 
music to the ears of the liberal.   
 Yet although enthusiasm for social funds is nearly unanimous among the IFIs and in the 
donor community, Judith Tendler cites evidence (drawn from reviews of social funds by the Inter-
American Development Bank, the World Bank, and UNICEF) that indicates reason for skepticism.  In 
its intended use, employment creation, social funds have been largely unsuccessful.  Indeed, it 
appears that other supply-driven programs had enjoyed much greater success, having “created more 
jobs, employed a more significant share of the labor force, and elicited significantly greater budgetary 
resources from their respective governments” (Tendler 93).  The few jobs that were created were 
temporary projects without training, and, in order to preclude drawing labor from the private sector 
non-poor, they were low-paying (Tendler 93).  And regarding the second goal of social funds, that 
they alleviate poverty, evidence indicates that social services delivered by these means do not 
necessarily reach the poor, as better-off communities, being better organized and better educated, are 
therefore better able to access the demand-driven structure (Tendler 94).   
 In the effort to relieve strapped line ministries from the burdens of social services delivery, 
responsibility for the sustainability and ownership of projects has fallen to the communities, with the 
result that projects are ill-maintained or rely upon continued donor support.  Often social funds have 
not complemented but replaced government funding of other institutions and programs addressing 
poverty.  There are important questions to ask regarding the capability of these communities to 
shoulder their new burdens.  Nongovernmental organizations have likewise been struggling to meet 
the new responsibilities required of them by this decentralized and demand-driven model (Tendler 96, 
99).   
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 “There is a view in some quarters,” writes Howard White (2), “that aid is becoming 
redundant, and its place will be taken by increased trade and private capital.”  Citing recent reductions 
in contributions to multilateral development banks, White nevertheless concludes that in the 1990s, 
aid represented 40 percent of all flows to developing nations, and almost 90 percent received by 
Africa (White 2).  The UN target for aid from developed countries, adopted by all DAC members 
except the United States and Switzerland, is 0.7 percent of GNP.  But White laments, “That target is 
further away than ever from being met,” as the current proportion of aid reaches only 0.20 percent of 
donor income (White 4).  By the 1980s, financial programme aid, increasingly tied to policy reform, 
was considered more important than food programme aid, which has fallen to only 5 percent, with 
most of those funds used for “food for work” programmes (White 18, 20).  During the period 1991-
2000, 27.9 percent of DAC aid went to social infrastructure and services, and 20 percent went to the 
economic sector (White 20).  There has been a shift, however, toward greater untying, as the average 
share of aid untied to a specific project made up 27.3 percent, as well as a shift toward grants over 
loans, with the ratio of grants to loans at about three to one (White 17,18,20).   
 The share of aid from the richest nation in the world, the United States, has dramatically 
decreased, falling from over half in the 1960s to well under a fifth in the 1990s.  In absolute terms, 
however, the United States still ranks as the second largest donor (behind Japan), having a 
programme just over twice the size of the next rank of contributions (from France, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom).  But of its second-largest share of aid, The US traditionally gives 20-25 percent to 
Israel (White 5).  
After the second World War, development assistance was explicitly targeted toward the goal 
of economic growth.  While the stated focus has since shifted to the alleviation of poverty, this hardly 
alters the traditional approach, as the contemporary literature continues to emphasize the alleged 
trade-off between economic growth and redistribution: “In very poor countries, economic growth 
rather than income redistribution is the key for long term poverty reduction” (Wodon and Yitzhaki, 
for the World Bank, 2).  The World Bank’s World Economic and Social Survey for 2003 makes it 
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clear that poverty alleviation is thought to require ever greater commitment to sustained economic 
growth.   
Because they have faster rates of population growth, developing countries need to 
grow faster than developed countries if they are to achieve year-to-year improvement 
in the well-being of their average citizen.  If they are to make meaningful progress 
towards reducing the number of people living in poverty, developing countries have 
to maintain a high growth rate continuously for an extended period of time” (7-8). 
 
 In September 2000, world leaders met at the Millennium Summit to set development targets 
discussed during international conferences during the 1990s.  From this Millenium Declaration, the 
IMF, World Bank, United Nations and OECD distilled this vision of development into eight specific 
goals, including 18 numerical targets and over 40 quantifiable indicators of progress.  In hopes of 
reducing by half the number of people living on less than a dollar a day by 2015, the World Bank now 
explicitly incorporates this goal into its development assistance.  Countries requesting assistance must 
now submit Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, in which they assess the nature and extent of poverty 
in their respective countries and propose specific resources and strategies that will be brought to bear 
upon the problem (PovertyNet at www.worldbank.org/poverty).  The preparation of these PRSPs is 
meant to encourage broad-based participation in national poverty alleviation efforts. Nevertheless, 
there was consensus among 39 countries and regional networks in 15 African countries at a meeting 
in Kampala in May of 2001 that PRSPs “were simply window dressing.”  The statement declared that 
“the PRSP process is simply delivering prepackaged structural adjustment programmes and is not 
delivering poverty focused development plans and has failed to involve civil society and 
parliamentarians in economic policy discussions” (Laderchi, Saith and Stewart 25).  
 Thomas Friedman has written about Neoliberal hegemony and the “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to development, citing Margaret Thatcher as the seamstress of what he calls the “Golden 
Straightjacket.”  After further reinforcement by Ronald Reagan, the garment was ready to be shipped 
out all over the world.  If a country wants to compete, it has to wear one.  To wear it right,  
a country must either adopt, or be seen as moving toward, the following golden rules: 
making the private sector the primary engine of its economic growth, maintaining a 
low rate of inflation and price stability, shrinking the size of its state bureaucracy, 
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maintaining as close to a balanced budget as possible, if not a surplus, eliminating 
and lowering tariffs on imported goods, removing restrictions on foreign investment, 
getting rid of quotas and domestic monopolies, increasing exports, privatizing state-
owned industries and utilities, deregulating capital markets, making its currency 
convertible, opening its industries, stock and bond markets to direct foreign 
ownership and investment, deregulating its economy to promote as much domestic 
competition as possible, eliminating government corruption, subsidies and kickbacks 
as much as possible, opening its banking and telecommunications systems to private 
ownership and competition and allowing its citizens to choose from an array of 
competing pension options and foreign-run pension and mutual funds (Friedman 
105). 
 
 Unfortunately, the Golden Straightjacket only comes in one size, so it gathers in some spots 
and pinches in others.  Radical deviations from the rules will result in the loss of investors and the 
flight of capital, so the best one can do is enlarge it, perhaps stuff it with some padding.  But the only 
way to enlarge it is to wear it even tighter (Friedman 106).   
 These liberal institutions and policies, rather than liberating people, are enslaving them to the 
vagaries of the market. This is due to misplaced trust in the allocations of the “invisible hand” and the 
ability of completion and economic growth, as a ”rising tide,” to “lift all boats.” The economic 
institutions and policies favored by the liberal are based upon two critical assumptions by which 
obligations are minimized. First, liberal economic theory assumes a trade-off between accumulation 
and redistribution, between policies enhancing economic growth and policies enhancing social 
welfare. Economic growth without redistributive policies is problematic, since the benefits of 
economic growth do not automatically “trickle down.” Likewise, policies for the benefit of social 
welfare are not sustainable without economic growth. Second, liberal political theory assumes that the 
negative obligation of forbearance is sufficient to allow individuals to enjoy liberty. Where positive 
obligation requires redistribution, classical liberal theory upholds private property rights and a 
“bootstrap” approach to the unfortunate. 
CHAPTER 2 
 
HAVING THE CAKE AND EATING IT TOO? 
THE ALLEGED TRADE-OFF BETWEEN ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
 
 
Social policy, whether enacted through national welfare states or adopted at the behest of the 
Bretton Woods institutions, does not exist in a vacuum.  As the ongoing retrenchment of the welfare 
state makes clear, social policy is affected not only by the internal political atmosphere but also the 
external economic environment.  The extent to which social policy is insulated and protected in the 
face of economic downturns has much to do with the prevailing economic theory.  Since the 1980s, 
the logic of neoliberalism has reigned supreme in economic and development planning.  While this 
paper questions the extent to which neoliberal theory and policy is logical at all, it is first necessary to 
provide a picture of its theoretical basis in economics.  In the following chapter I provide the 
economic context in which development planning is embedded.   
According to the classical growth theory, as exhibited by the Harrod-Domar model and W.W. 
Rostow’s five stages of economic development, redistributive efforts are assumed to be detrimental to 
sustained growth, since the rate of growth is directly proportional to the savings ratio.  Growth in 
GNP essentially depends upon how great a portion of GNP can be saved and reinvested.  Thus, 
consumption must obviously be curbed (Todaro 72).  This traditional approach to development 
illustrates an alleged trade-off between the goal of social welfare and that of economic growth, 
between distribution and accumulation.  Expenditure on social welfare programs further diminishes 
the national savings rate.  An unequal distribution of income was thought to boost capital 
accumulation through promoting savings, since wealthier households tend to save more.   
The success of the Marshall Plan in rebuilding European economies through massive foreign 
aid and investment signaled a vindication for many economists, heightening expectations for similar 
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results in the developing world (Coetzee and Ligthelm 1986: 180).  Optimistic aspirations of 
imitating the development patterns of industrialized Western nations turned out to be unrealistic, and 
the policies copied from earlier successes were found to be inappropriate to the conditions prevailing 
in most of the developing world.  The much-heralded phenomenon of convergence failed to 
materialize on anything close to a global level.  This is not to say that the more traditional approach to 
development failed to win adherents.  So called “big push” models continued to take Rostow’s 
requirements for take-off very seriously, and efforts to accumulate capital emphasized the 
encouragement of investment in order to spur rapid industrialization (Todaro 235).  Once hailed as a 
miracle, Brazil’s performance in adherence to this model indicated the shortcomings of the 
accumulation without redistribution strategy.  Antonio Delfim Netto, the minister of finance through 
the “big push,” stated unequivocally Brazil’s stance on the alleged trade-off: “No one can achieve 
rapid development without concentrating wealth.  You’ve got to make the cake bigger before you can 
start slicing it up” (Sloan 225).  The society which resulted has been referred to as “Belgium in 
India,” since a population of 22 million having per capita incomes of US$1,200 exists alongside 85 
million forced to make do with less than one dollar a day (Baer 81, Sloan 231).  The wealthiest five 
percent received 20 times the income of the poorest 40 percent in 1960; a decade later, this proportion 
increased to 32 times (Sloan 231).  In 1974, President Medici had to admit the unfortunate (if not 
altogether surprising) result: “The economy is doing well, but the people are doing poorly” (Sloan 
232).  The social indicators for Brazil, despite its impressive industrialization, resemble those of 
countries considerably poorer and less developed (Sloan 231).  Life expectancy at birth reached only 
53.5 years in 1970, increasing to 60.1 by the next decade.  Infant mortality stood at 113.8 deaths per 
thousand live births in 1970, and was reduced to 87.9 in 1980 (Maddison 84). 
 But many liberals were still willing to accept increased income inequality along with rapid 
industrialization and GDP growth, because the only well established theory linking growth and 
distribution assured them that this was a temporary side-effect of what was essentially healthy 
development.  Simon Kuznets’ “inverted-U” curve indicated that income inequality would increase as 
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workers began to move from agrarian sectors to more profitable industrial sectors, then decrease as 
the movement came to equalize returns across sectors (Ferreira 1999, 1).  Most growth models at the 
time, and for a long period afterward, utilized the “representative agent,” basing studies of growth on 
a society which acted as a single individual might.  Add to this the use of aggregate growth statistics, 
referring to “the evolution of one moment of the distribution,” the mean, and the importance of social 
inequalities was successfully disguised (Ferreira 2).   
 But even as social and income inequalities both within and between countries was being 
artfully transfigured to present these as validation of economic law, economists and strategists 
wielded another economic principle to justify gross inequalities in the global division of labor.  
Ricardo’s “comparative advantage” worked nicely for these purposes, allowing brutal competition 
within an unforgiving global market to be passed off as benevolent workings of global cooperation.  
Ricardo wrote, “Under a system of perfectly free commerce, each country naturally devotes its capital 
and labor to such employments as are most beneficial to each.  This pursuit of individual advantage is 
admirably connected with the universal good of the whole” (Harrington 36).  According to 
Harrington’s reading, “the notion of comparative advantage . . . gave imperialists a sophisticated 
reason for picturing themselves as the humble servant of economic laws that would ultimately do 
more to better the globe than any sentimental attempts at redistribution of wealth” (Harrington 39).  
Thus it is not unfair that a few rich countries specialize in design and management of high-
technology, high-productivity enterprises, while the poor countries are relegated to manual labor in 
low-productivity pursuits, mostly supplying the cheap raw materials fueling the production and profit 
of the richer countries.  It is just a natural order. 
 In the 1960s and 1970s scholars, mostly from developing countries and especially Latin 
America, sought to emphasize and describe the global inequalities which resulted in the 
“development of underdevelopment.”  Conceived in large part as a reaction to Rostow’s Stages of 
Economic Growth, subtitled “a non-Communist Manifesto,” and modernization theory which urged 
developing countries to adopt the technologies, institutions, and cultural features of the developed 
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countries, dependency and world-system perspectives stressed the history of global capitalism’s 
unequal development.  Consistent with Smith’s theorization, the world economy was based upon a 
division of labor.  But contrary to the enthusiastic expectations of some theorists, this arrangement did 
not result in uniform development through comparative advantage, but rather gains at the center of 
this system at the expense of those on the periphery.  Samuel Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela 
write: “The interdependent nature of the world capitalist system and the qualitative transformations in 
that system over time make it inconceivable to think that individual nations on the periphery could 
somehow replicate the evolutionary experience of the now developed nations” (Valenzuela and 
Valenzuela 265).          
 Drawing on a Marxist understanding of imperialism, dependentistas emphasized the 
structural formation of interconnections by which the industrialization of the central colonial powers 
was made possible by the consumption of primary goods taken from the peripheral colonies 
(Valenzuela and Valenzuela 264-5, dos Santos 253).  Thus the productive capacities of peripheral 
countries were directed not toward the needs of their national populations but rather toward export 
markets determined by the needs of the imperial powers.  Post-independence production did not 
achieve industrialization, but only solidified domestic monopolies run by local elites (Valenzuela and 
Valenzuela 268).  Efforts to achieve industrialization through import substitution, although successful 
in achieving high but short-term growth rates in Argentina, Mexico and Brazil, represented 
dependency in an altered form, as developing countries relied on foreign supplies and investment 
(Valenzuela 269).  Import substitution industrialization eventually resulted in unsustainable trade and 
payment imbalances and enormous debts, not only because of the control exerted by foreign capital, 
but also because unequal trade relations decrease the price of developing countries’ primary products 
while increasing the prices of imported industrial products (dos Santos 255, 254).  Its downfall, 
however, was finally due to the further transformation of the world system toward further 
internationalization of the market and the rise of multinational corporations (Valenzuela and 
Valenzuela 269).                                                                    
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But it wasn’t just the critics of the prevailing development perspective whose attention was 
drawn to inequality.  Belief in Kuznets’ assurances and faith in the automatic “trickling down” of the 
benefits of growth was wearing thin by the United Nations Second Development Decade, in the 
1970s, and empirical studies utilizing larger data sets (across countries and within countries over 
time) have since refuted Kuznets’ hypothesis (Ferreira 4).  Reports in the seventies, like the 1974 
World Bank—Sussex report by Hollis Chenery, et. al., suggested “redistribution with growth” 
(Brundenius 1-2), and that same year the Patterns of Resource Use, Environment, and Development 
Strategies symposium, organized by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), discussed development explicitly in terms of human development: 
Our first concern is to redefine the whole purpose of development.  This should not 
be to develop things but to develop man.  Human beings have basic needs: food, 
shelter, clothing, health, education.  Any process of growth that does not lead to their 
fulfillment—or, worse, disrupts them—is a travesty of the idea of development 
(Brundenius 2). 
 
 By the 1990s, the United Nations Development Programme expressed its focus as 
“development with a human face,” defining development in terms of quality of life assessments, 
including life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, gender empowerment indicators, income poverty 
and income inequality, and access to clean water, health services, and sanitation. 
 Yet even while acknowledging the social costs of neoliberal adjustment policies, prevailing 
economic policy is geared toward protecting and enhancing the liberty of capital, at the expense of the 
liberty of persons.  Capital is no longer restrained by national boundaries, and conventional wisdom 
in economics extols the virtues and benefits of free trade.  The benefits to foreign enterprises are 
obvious, as they are able to relocate their businesses to more favorable environments, where the labor 
and tax costs are lower.  Informed by the Harrod-Domar theory, policymakers regard foreign 
investment as augmentation of domestic savings, which should boost economic performance 
(Firebaugh 326).  The modernization and “catch-up” models emphasize not only the augmented 
savings but also the necessary innovations in technology and management which come with foreign 
investment.  Also not to be discounted among the benefits are the jobs these corporations bring with 
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them.  Thus developing nations create incentives, mostly in the form of tax relief, to attract foreign 
and multinational corporations.  The problem with this conception of foreign investment is that it fails 
to account for the liberty of capital to flow the other way.  There is a tendency for capital to enter a 
developing country and then leave, making little or no contribution to domestic savings.   
Recent innovation in the economic environment is the presence of multinational corporations 
and free trade zones, built upon the logic of free capital mobility.  There are now over 850 “export 
processing zones” around the world, employing around 27 million people, mostly women 
(www.icftu.org).   In these plants, unfinished materials are brought into the zone without restriction or 
tariff, are processed into finished products, and leave the country without being taxed.  Corporations 
in these free trade zones effectively operate outside the host country’s jurisdiction - - it is as if they 
never really entered the port at all.  David Natacha relates the failure of “catch-up” hypotheses: 
“[A]lthough the combination of direct investment, jobs and the transfer of technology should all help 
stimulate the development of the host country’s economy, the fact is that there is virtually no link 
between the EPZs and the economies of the countries they operate in” (www.icftu.org).  World 
systems theorists have long asserted that transnational penetration into developing countries is 
negatively associated with economic growth  (Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985), the provision of 
basic needs (London and Williams 1988), and fertility decline (London 1988), and positively 
associated with high mortality (Wimberly 1990), urban bias (London and Smith 1988) and rebellion 
(Boswell and Dixon 1990).  Glenn Firebaugh, however, interprets the results differently, finding that 
foreign investment does indeed benefit least developed countries.  Nevertheless, “from the host 
country’s perspective, all capital is not equal; the source does matter.  Homegrown capital 
outperforms imported capital” (Firebaugh 331).  Agosin and Mayer, in a discussion paper for 
UNCTAD, write: “The assumption that underpins policy toward [foreign direct investment] in most 
developing countries—that FDI is always good for a country’s development and that a liberal policy 
toward MNEs is sufficient to ensure positive effects—fails to be upheld by the data” (Agosin and 
Mayer 14).  Instead, FDI usually enters sectors where there are already competing domestic firms, 
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taking away investment opportunities that were previously open to domestic entrepreneurs (Agosin 
and Mayer 3). 
The competition which results may be devastating to domestic businesses.  The film Life and 
Debt documents the effects on Jamaica’s domestic producers of IMF-directed trade liberalization.  
Homegrown produce cannot compete with cheaper imported fruit and vegetables in the domestic 
market, so it is shipped abroad.  Domestic dairy producers must pour out hundreds of gallons of milk 
each day because most of the population drink cheap powdered milk imported from the United States.  
This picture is incongruous with our notion of development, for we expect, at the least, some minimal 
self-sufficiency. 
Yet self-sufficiency seems to have no place in the new global economic environment, for 
globalization is all about interdependency.  But scholars continue to question the nature of this 
interrelationship, suggesting that it is characterized not by a global village but instead by global 
pillage.  The freedom of multinational corporations to relocate to environments maximizing profit “in 
effect makes all workers, communities and countries competitors for these corporations’ favor.  The 
consequence is a ‘race to the bottom’ in which wages and social and environmental conditions tend to 
fall to the level of the most desperate” (Brecher 48).  For example, a California-based company called 
Made in Mexico offers entrepreneurs 75 percent off labor costs for establishing maquiladoras over 
the Mexican border.  The benefits to American companies relocating assembly, finishing or 
packaging facilities in Mexico are numerous.  Thanks to the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), they can expect to pay no tariffs on raw materials, equipment or components.  Import of 
machinery from NAFTA partners is also duty-free, and export, either to Mexican markets or, more 
frequently, back to the United States, is cheap and easy.  Since the Mexican wage is 25 percent of the 
minimum wage in the United States, labor costs are slashed.  And with a 48 hour work week, 
production proceeds at a rapid pace (www.madeinmexico.com). The word maquiladora refers to the 
finishing of a product—indicating that such facilities are export-processing centers, but to the critics 
and activists working on behalf of workers’ rights, it is just another name for a sweatshop.  Since the 
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foreign corporations are ever seeking not only lower wages but also less regulation in worker safety 
and environmental protection, the effects of the maquiladoras, as those of other export processing 
facilities around the globe, can be detrimental to the host country’s own efforts to enhance the public 
welfare.  And since little of the huge profit margin arising from these conditions is reinvested into the 
host country, there is little going back into the public coffers. Thus the benefits arising out of this 
arrangement are decidedly one-way. 
There is little wonder, then, that incomes are decreasing while the concentration of wealth is 
increasing.  Contemporary analysis seems to show that as global GNP rises and interdependence 
increases on a global scale, inequality is not diminishing, as had been expected.  Higher income does 
not automatically translate into a higher standard of living, in rich or poor countries.  The United 
States, for example, has the highest average income of industrialized countries, but also the highest 
portion of the population in poverty (UNDP 1998, 2).  This is because the United States also ranks 
higher than any other industrialized country in terms of income inequality.  We find the same deeply 
ingrained inequality in developing countries, especially in Latin America.  And while the relative 
inequality of wealth and income in countries overwhelmed by destitution (such as sub-Saharan 
Africa) is not that significant, the extremely low income, and corresponding increase in malnutrition 
and poverty, attests to a larger inequality in terms of global wealth (Kim 1911-1912).  It has been 
stated that “the world’s 358 wealthiest individuals (distinguished by possessing at least $1 billion in 
assets) had a combined wealth of $762 billion in 1994—the equivalent of the income of 2.4 billion 
people at the bottom of the scale, or 45 percent of the global population” (Renner 276).   
It matters a great deal that Renner compares wealth and income, for this distinction gets to the 
heart of the inequality.  Wealth, embodied in savings, assets and investments, provides one with the 
security that is lacking when one relies solely on income.  Even with a relatively high income, one is 
still vulnerable to economic downturns and other misfortunes such as illness or unemployment.  The 
solution is usually debt, which further diminishes one’s net income.  One with wealth, however, is 
insulated from the crises that may devastate the wage earner. 
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With the persistence of inequality and the demise of Kuznets’ hopeful prognosis, 
neoliberalism sought to reevaluate the interaction between economic growth and inequality.  While 
the World Bank denies that income inequality within countries, on average, has increased in the last 
three decades and that existing data shows any stable relationship, it nevertheless admits their 
interaction can result in negative effects.  “Countries with high levels of initial inequality have 
reduced poverty less for given rates of growth than countries with low initial inequality, and if growth 
is accompanied by increasing inequality, its impact on poverty will be reduced” (PovertyNet, at 
www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/trends/inequal.htm).  Wodon and Yitzhaki indicate three ways in 
which high inequality contributes to higher poverty levels.  First, higher poverty is implied by 
increased inequality since it is a diminishment of the resources consumed at the bottom of the 
distribution.  Second, high initial inequality may inhibit growth, which is required for the alleviation 
of poverty.  Third, where growth is possible, high initial inequality further diminishes the share of its 
benefits distributed to the poor (Wodon and Yitzhaki 1).  Yet they maintain that  
In very poor countries, economic growth rather than income redistribution is the key 
for long term poverty reduction.  Evaluating programs and policies according to their 
impact on the distribution alone may lead to the rejection of interventions which may 
not be highly redistributive, but which have strong growth potential.  This may be 
detrimental not only to poverty reduction, but also more broadly to the overall level 
of well-being in society (Wodon and Yitzhaki 2).  
 
 And, again, neoliberal economic theory sticks to its guns, maintaining that “integration into 
the global trading environment and the import of diverse and modern technologies” is required for 
productivity improvements crucial to poverty reduction.  Since the poor are likely to have little 
influence over policy, it is assumed that protectionist trade policy “often acts to tax the poor, and that 
liberalization can therefore do much to improve incomes of the poor.  However,” it is admitted in the 
World Bank PRSP Sourcebook, accepting the trade-off, “in the short run liberalization may have a 
negative impact on some of the poor, depending on their source of income and the impact on prices of 
goods and services the poor consume” (Hoekman, et. al. 1). 
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 Empirical evidence dispels the classical assumption in economics that an unequal distribution 
of income and wealth, especially favoring the rich, is good for economic growth.  Regressing the 
average growth rate over 1960-1985 on the Gini coefficient of income and of land around 1960, 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) find a negative impact of inequality on growth (Aghion, et. al. 1617-
1618). Studies by Haussmann and Gavin (1996) and Breen and Garcia-Peñalosa (1998) have also 
found income inequality to be positively correlated with macroeconomic volatility, the neoliberal’s 
nightmare.  On the other hand, redistribution has been shown in several studies to have a positive and 
significant impact on economic growth.  Perotti (1992) finds that greater availability of credit has a 
positive effect on the growth rate.  In a more recent work (1996), Perotti again shows a positive and 
significant effect of redistribution, measured by the marginal tax rate (Aghion, et. al. 1619).   
The economic assumptions of neoliberalism do not hold up in the face of empirical data. But 
this is only part of the picture, as these data fail to present what is actually at the core of development. 
The UNDP’s Human Development Report paints a rather more complicated picture of the interaction 
between economic and social development than do studies based upon economic indicators alone.  No 
longer can it be assumed that with increases in income, human development automatically follows, as 
adherents to the “Washington Consensus” would have us believe.  Especially noteworthy in the 
Human Development Index is analysis utilizing a ranking of real GDP per capita (in purchasing 
power parity dollars) against a Human Development Index ranking (according to life expectancy at 
birth, adult literacy rate and combined enrolment ratio, and adjusted per capita income in $PPP).  
According to the 1999 Human Development Report, countries with the same rank in both indices 
were the United States and Ireland, under “high” human development, and Ecuador and Nicaragua, 
having achieved “medium” human development.  One might not be surprised to find that several 
African and oil-producing countries performed much more poorly in human development than their 
per capita incomes might have suggested.  With similar per capita incomes of $7,690 and $7,550, 
Botswana and Gabon are ranked 122 and 124 on the HDI.  Subtracting the HDI ranking from the per 
capita GDP income rank, their scores are –70 and  -71.  Kuwait earns –30, and Saudi Arabia scores –
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37.  But of special interest to this paper is the country with the highest positive difference in ranking, 
Cuba.  With the economic woes faced by Cuba, including dependence on sugar, the fall of her patron 
the Soviet Union, and over forty years of the US embargo, it is no surprise to see her per capita 
income estimated at $3,100, ranking similarly to China, Guyana, or Iraq.  But Cuba’s social indicators 
tell a much different story, as life expectancy, adult literacy, and combined first-, second- and third- 
level gross enrolment ratio are well above the average for countries ranked under “medium” human 
development.  Cuba’s life expectancy in 1997 was the same as Denmark’s, 75.7 years (UNDP 1999 
134-136).  How is it that Cuba’s population has remained so healthy and educated despite such rocky 
economic conditions, including food shortages? 
 An examination of Cuban Revolutionary economic may provide a richer illustration of some 
themes already mentioned, for Cuba’s self-stated aims at the outset of her Revolution are nearly 
diametrically opposed to those of Brazil during her own state-led revolution. Since both the Cuban 
revolutionaries and the Brazilian military came to power by force, their intolerance of the prior 
management and the objectives they favored were explicitly stated.  I hope that a comparison of their 
development paths may prove helpful in drawing out the questions arising from the alleged trade-off 
between social welfare and economic growth, and also in sketching out a few answers. 
The buoyancy of Cuba’s health statistics despite economic hardship is due in large part to 
steadfast adherence to her Revolutionary principles, stated by Fidel Castro in his defense of the 
Moncada attack, “History Will Absolve Me.”   
The problems concerning land, the problem of industrialization, the problem of 
housing, the problem of unemployment, the problem of education and the problem of 
the health of the people; these are the six problems we would take immediate steps to 
resolve, along with the restoration of public liberties and political democracy (Castro 
383). 
 
 Benjamin, et. al. assert the special moral character of the Revolution’s objectives:  
The Cuban Revolution declared, from the outset, that no one should go malnourished.  
No disappointment in food production, no failed economic take-off, no shock wave 
from the world economic crisis has deterred Cuba from freeing itself from the 
suffering and shame of a single wasted child or an elderly person ignominiously 
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subsisting on pet food.  No other country in this hemisphere, including the United 
States, can make this claim (Cole 13). 
 
 Cuba has no doubt experienced her share of disappointment in food (and especially sugar) 
production, take-off failures, and shock waves, yet the latest development data from the World 
Bank’s HNP statistics indicate that Cuba still spends a greater share of her gross domestic product in 
health expenditure than any other country examined.  At 8.2%, Cuba spends much more than the 
United States’ 5.8%, or even the average of high income countries, at 6.7% 
(www.devdata.worldbank.org).  Obviously the United States’ smaller portion spent on health services 
is a greater sum of money than Cuba’s larger portion, but in a sense that makes the point all that much 
clearer.  Cuba has less money to spread out over necessary expenses, yet since the health of the 
population was one of the chief aims of the Revolution, she continues to devote a larger percentage to 
health expenditure than does Sweden.   
 Another of her aims materialized in policy soon after the revolutionaries’ victory.  Initially, 
the propertied classes that had opposed Batista were optimistic in 1959, relying on Castro’s promises 
to boost investor confidence by honoring the past regime’s debts.  Soon thereafter, however, Castro 
began to show his true commitments, seizing the US-owned Cucan Electric Company, cutting rates in 
half, and reducing rents (by half for those paying less than 100 pesos a month and 30-40 percent for 
those in higher brackets).  Castro, undeterred by the cries of betrayal from the wealthy classes, 
continued to damage the investment value of real estate with the Vacant Lot Law (Brundenius 41-2). 
 The Agrarian Reform Law of 1959, drafted by the 26th of July Movement even before 
Batista’s fall, was a means of meeting multiple objectives, including increasing the efficiency of 
agricultural production as well as the socioeconomic positions of its workers (Brundenius 42, del 
Aguila 50-51).  By May 1961, 44 percent of Cuba’s farmlands had been collectivized and 
redistributed (del Aguila 50).  A “vital minimum” of 27 hectares, for a family of five, was freely 
distributed, and a maximum limit of 402 hectares was set for private ownership (sometimes raised in 
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the case of raising cattle) (Brundenius 43).  Castro continued to expand the state’s control over the 
means of production by expropriating US firms (del Aguila 52).   
 In November 1961, partly in response to the hostility of the United States and the need to 
court new (socialist) trading partners, Castro declared himself Marxist-Leninist.  Most businessmen, 
many middle and upper class Cubans, left the island.  According to Eckstein, “Their exodus hastened 
government appropriations of the ‘means of production’ and the class transformation in turn” 
(Eckstein 32).  Before 1959, Cuba had one of the largest incomes per capita in Latin America.  The 
poorest 40 percent, however, received only about .066 percent of this income.  By the mid-1970s, this 
share had increased to 25 percent (Cole 15).  The swift redistribution had major repercussions in the 
market, since production and distribution were no longer determined by market mechanisms of 
supply and demand (Mesa-Lago 12).  The exodus of technicians and managers also had detrimental 
effects on economic planning, for their positions were filled by inexperienced revolutionaries (Mesa-
Lago 13).  The rather modest growth achievements produced overconfidence and bold predictions of 
a 10 percent growth rate (Brundenius 48). 
 While Cuba’s economic performance following the revolution is generally understood as the 
result of utilization of unused and expropriated resources, its early (moderate) success appeared to be 
due to the transformation of consumption.  Collectivization, redistribution, and expropriation of the 
lands of those who left the island obviously accounted for a considerable stock of resources.  But 
more importantly, the disposable incomes of the previously poor sectors were increased through not 
only higher wages and employment but also reduced expenses.  This situation brings a confrontation 
with two difficulties which would continue to plague Cuba.  First, the newfound purchasing power 
put enormous strain on the resource reserves, which were not being sufficiently rebuilt (Mesa-Lago 
14, Brundenius 49).  Second, the government expenditures which had such a tremendous effect on 
social welfare were becoming increasingly burdensome for the economy.  Shortages became 
prevalent, and rationing had to be introduced. 
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 The Soviet model of heavy industrialization through import substitution was found to be 
grossly inappropriate for the existing management and infrastructure, and early efforts to free Cuba 
from dependence on sugar not only failed to materialize but also hurt the agricultural sector.  When 
Cuba returned to sugar production in 1963 the economy was under the helmsmanship of Ernesto 
“Che” Guevara.  Moral incentives and voluntary “over-fulfillment” were crucial to Guevara’s model 
of centralized planning, since the necessary surpluses could not come from decreasing consumption 
(which was already reduced by shortages) (Silverman 20, Cole 30).   
 With renewed egalitarian spirit, the government provided extended social services free of 
charge, including all education, health care, social security, day care, and a good portion of housing 
(Eckstein 34).  But in its “push for communism,” Cuba had skipped an important step.  The 
government sought to allocate “to each according to his need,” passing the essential socialist stage in 
Marxism calling for allocation according to contribution (Eckstein 41).  After the recession of 1963, 
growth did resume in the following period, due to the reasonably good sugar harvest and increased 
sugar prices in the international market (Mesa-Lago 22).  Moral incentives, however, failed to create 
the social consciousness the revolutionaries had envisioned, and the exceedingly high expectations for 
the 1970 sugar harvest not only failed but also hurt the productivity in the years preceding it.  
According to Mesa-Lago (25), "Economic chaos ensued." 
 I shall pause here to make an important point.  The sketches I have made of the development 
plans of Brazil and Cuba appear to illustrate incomplete renderings of development.  Table 1 
illustrates their respective achievements in the area of social welfare.  Although one may wish to 
point out that Cuba’s population was already healthier that Brazil’s even before each began its 
respective revolution, Cuba’s continued commitment to public health is still evident.  
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Table 1: 
Comparison of social indicators for Brazil and Cuba, 1950-1990 
 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 
Life Expectancy   
Cuba 59 (1950-55) 64 70 74 75 
Brazil 44.5 51.6 53.5 60.1 65 (1994)
Infant Mortality   
Cuba 39 (1945-49) 35 36 20 11 
Brazil 146.4 121.1 113.8 87.9 69 (1992)
Literacy   
Cuba na 78 85 90 (1976) 96 
Brazil 49.3 60.5 65.9 73.9 81  
 
Infant mortality = # deaths per 1,000 live births. 
Literacy = % of literate population over 15 years of age. 
Brazil data taken from Maddison, Table 4.5, p. 84, except 1990 Infant mortality and literacy, from Todaro, p. 21, and 1994 
life expectancy, from Sen p. 47. 
Life expectancy and infant mortality for Cuba taken from Eckstein Table 5.2, p. 226.  Cuban literacy, 1950-1976, taken 
from Sloan Table 18, p. 93.  Cuban literacy in 1990 estimated by Del Aguila, p. 1. 
 
 
 The most extreme differences between the development paths of Cuba and Brazil are shown 
in Table 2, in the extent to which the richest and poorest benefited from economic growth.  The 
distributive policies of the Cuban revolutionaries and the Brazilian military are diametrically opposed 
upon their taking power, with the richest five percent experiencing increased shares in Brazil and 
radical decreased shares in Cuba.  Likewise, the share of the poorest 40 percent decreased in Brazil, 
but saw an increase in Cuba.  However, that is just the beginning of the story, for both Brazil’s 
growth without redistribution and Cuba’s redistribution without sufficient growth were eventually 
unsustainable.  This explains the slight turnaround in both countries toward the end of the period 
measured.  The richest five percent actually received an increased share between 1973 and 1978 in 
Cuba, and the poorest 40 percent experienced an increase toward the end of Brazil’s dictatorship.  
This represents explicit acknowledgement of the failures of previous development planning.  Thus 
Brazil’s second development plan (1975-1979) admitted its misgivings about the results of its 
“miracle” and declared its change of strategy: 
[T]he government has rejected the position of waiting until economic growth by itself 
solves the problem of income distribution, or the theory of “waiting for the cake to 
grow bigger.”  It is necessary, while maintaining an accelerated rate of growth, to 
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undertake redistributive policies “while the cake is growing.”  The truth is that, on 
the one hand, growth may not solve the problem of adequate distribution of income, 
if left to the mere evolution of market factors.  And on the other hand the growth 
solution, if left to itself, may take far longer than social conscience will permit in 
terms of the need to improve rapidly the level of welfare of wide sectors of the 
population (Brundenius 2). 
 
 
 
Table 2: 
 
Brazil and Cuba, per capita income and growth by strata (equivalent in $US 1980) 
 
  Per capita Income of the  
Poorest 40% 
Per capita Income of the 
Richest 5% 
 GDP/capita  
Dollars 
   Dollars %Total 
Income 
   Dollars  %Total 
Income 
Brazil      
      1960       651       197      11.5%      3,788      27.7% 
      1970       924       233      10.1%      6,450      34.9% 
      1980     1,652       401        9.9%    11,298      34.2% 
Annual 
growth rate 
     
1960-1970        3.5%        1.7%           5.3%  
1970-1980        5.9%        5.4%         5.6%  
Cuba      
      1958*        866        182       6.5%      5,947       26.5% 
      1962        882        379      17.2%      2,237       12.7% 
      1973        996        506      20.3%      1,892         9.5% 
      1978      1,395        865      24.8%      3,068       11.0% 
Annual 
growth rate 
     
1958-1962         0.5%      18.3%           -24.4%  
1962-1973         1.1%       2.6%         -1.5%  
1973-1978         6.7%      10.7%          9.7%  
 
Extracted from Claes Brundenius, Table 6.3 (p. 124) 
*(Assuming that there was no change in income distribution between 1953 and 1958) 
 
 Likewise, Cuba recognized the inadequacies of the Guevarist experiment based upon moral 
incentive, with even Castro declaring that the previous stage had been idealistic.  Mesa-Lago writes 
that “it was realized that it is easier to change the economic structure than man’s consciousness, that 
the latter has a long way to go, and that material base development should precede efforts to raise the 
consciousness of society” (Mesa-Lago 28).  Moral incentives gave way to material incentives, with 
consumer goods such as televisions and refrigerators offered for excellent work records.  Planning 
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emphasized profit, and annual growth rates during the years 1971 through 1975 climbed to an 
astounding 16.3 percent, as compared with an average rate of growth of 0.4 percent in the late 1960s.  
The economic results of the respective efforts of Brazil and Cuba are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: 
 
Brazil and Cuba, average annual rates of growth in GDP per capita, 1960-1982 
 
     1960-1970    1970-1978     1978-1982     1960-1982 
Brazil           3.5           6.1           0.3           3.9 
Cuba          -0.2           5.9           3.4           2.7 
 
Extracted from Claes Brundenius Table 6.1 (p. 123) 
[Cuban GDP estimate = Total Material Production (from agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining, manufacturing, electricity, 
and construction) + Gross Material Product (from transport, communication, and commerce) + Non-Material Services] 
 
 
The experiences of Brazil and Cuba during periods of state-led development planning 
indicate that the relationship between redistribution and economic growth is a great deal more 
complex than a simple trade-off.  They are not mutually exclusive results, and they should not be 
conceived as independent aims.  Yet I hasten to add that their relationship is not an automatic positive 
correlation, either, as the IMF, World Bank and WTO would insist.   
 Cuba’s continued high expenditure on public health, as well as the sustained high ranking it 
receives on social indicators, indicates, nevertheless, that nations can maintain their commitments to 
the social welfare of their citizens even in the face of economic difficulties.  In this sense, Cuba 
makes a rather extreme case, both in the zeal behind her revolutionary principles and in the extent to 
which those principles have been tested.  I do not wish to minimalize the external economic 
conditions which hamper Cuba’s industrialization and economic growth, for in addition to the 
difficulties faced by other countries on the periphery of the global economy, Cuba continues to suffer 
under the Helms-Burton Act, solidifying an economic blockade initiated by the United States over 
forty years ago.  But although there have been huge changes in the Cuban economy, perhaps most 
importantly partial-dollarization, the commitment to social welfare remains.  My point is not 
weakened because the Marxist does not call these “rights”; the obligation is still there.  My purpose is 
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not to advocate a Marxist state, but rather to show the liberal that his own values and commitments to 
liberty and human rights entail similar obligations on the part of the state. 
 In light of the colonial experiences of developing countries, bringing ossifies hierarchy and 
systemic inequalities, that socialism was an attractive alternative to postcolonial leaders is perhaps not 
surprising. Yet many soon learned that political independence did not guarantee economic 
independence, not under the dominance of the free market ideology, nor the reign of neoliberalism, 
and certainly not in the era of globalization. So despite the often cruel outcomes of the much-hailed 
freedom of the market, prevailing economic thought and policy put the onus solely on factors internal 
to the underdeveloped states. From the point of view of the international financial institutions and 
international donor countries, protecting domestic producers, markets and currency is economic 
heresy, although many richer donor countries feel no obligation to reciprocate in opening. The 
Bretton Woods institutions sought, from heir beginnings, to enforce macroeconomic stability, since 
mismanagement of the financial sector and fiscal irresponsibility were thought to be the main 
obstacles to economic growth and industrialization. Modernization theorists explained failed take-off 
in terms of deficient cultural ambition and stubborn backwardness. Foreign capital saw corruption 
and restriction rather than incentives, and moved elsewhere. During the Cold War, many developing 
countries were viewed as, and consequently, treated as, pawns in the battle against the Soviet Union. 
Exorbitant military budgets were favored over extensive public subsidies, and thus many developing 
countries have experiences not only coup d’etat and interventions, but also civil war and genocide. 
 Even within industrialized nations, and mist conspicuously in the Untied States, there is 
resistance to the notion of public provisions of social welfare. Positive obligations on the part of the 
state or its affluent citizens are considered to be an intolerable constraint on liberty. But one must ask, 
upon examining the classical roots of liberal theory, whether it is liberty which is being protected or 
private property? 
CHAPTER 3 
 
GIVE ME LIBERTY OR GIVE ME MORE STUFF:  
LIBERTY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE ROOTS OF LIBERALISM 
 
 
 John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government, the classical statement of liberalism, was 
intended to establish the foundation of government upon the consent of the people.  Central to his 
version of constitutional government was the recognition of natural rights, which the state is bound to 
protect.  But Locke’s motive in establishing a civil government thus limited was essentially to support 
one right in particular: the right to unlimited accumulation of private property.   
 Ownership is an important theme in Locke’s writing.  As we are “all the workmanship of one 
omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one sovereign master,” all are “his 
property” (Locke 9).  It is by this relationship that we have the obligation of self-preservation.  
Likewise, that which is our workmanship becomes our property, based upon the ownership we have 
of our own persons.   
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has 
a property in his own person; this no body has any right to but himself.  The labour 
of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his.  Whatsoever 
then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath 
mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that it his own, and thereby makes 
his property (Locke 19). 
 
And, likewise, with this right also comes an obligation.  Among the things which God has given all 
humankind to enjoy and, crucially, for sustenance, there is a limit to that which can be rightfully 
accumulated.  “As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much 
he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to 
others.  Nothing was made by God to spoil or destroy” (Locke 21).   
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 Locke makes a couple of interesting justifications for the taking of private property from that 
which is common to all.  First, he makes it seem less private, founding it upon more universal 
statements of the human condition.  We take things out of the common stock because our survival 
demands it.  Shall we deny a man the nourishment he needs because the ownership of food is in 
question?  But although this appears to be the more fruitful approach to defining property, Locke 
concentrates on a slightly different argument, which stretches the limitation somewhat.  It is our duty 
to God, not just to sustain ourselves, but to “subdue the earth, i.e. improve it for the benefit of life” 
(Locke 21).  The emphasis is less on the necessity of sustenance as the necessity of labor.  “Labour 
[not human need] was to be his title to it” (Locke 21).  After the quoted passage, Locke goes on to 
broaden the use of property even further.  In section 28 of the chapter on property, Locke talks of 
nourishment; without the appropriation of property, we would have starved! (Locke 19).  By section 
34, he is already talking about the “conveniencies of life” (Locke 21).   
 But although Locke continues to enlarge the realm of expectations, so to speak, to increase 
that which humans may feel they deserve, there are limitations.  The first is the spoilage criterion, 
which limits private property to that which may be used before it spoils (Locke 21).  Then there is 
what Jack Donnelly calls the “sufficiency limit” (Donnelly 94).  It is immediately apparent, however, 
that Locke finds it to be no severe limitation.  Ownership of one’s own labor entitles one to all he 
mixes it with, provided “there is enough, and as good, left in common for others” (Locke 19).  It 
never occurs to Locke to discuss scarcity and its consequences for natural rights, because he just 
assumes abundance.  He mentions resources like land and water, but apparently assumes these to be 
limitless, resulting in a rather unusual claim no economist would validate: “he that leaves as much as 
another can make use of, does as good as take nothing at all” (Locke 21).  Now that is an imaginative 
approach to resource allocation—not to mention what unbounded land and bottomless rivers might 
look like on a globe!   
“[T]his I dare boldly affirm, that the same rule of propriety, (viz.) that every man 
should have as much as he could make use of, would hold still in the world, without 
straightening any body; since there is land enough in the world to suffice double the 
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inhabitants . . .”.  Yet this rather naive, if not utopian, economic picture soon gets 
complicated, for he continues, “. . . had not the invention of money, and the tacit 
agreement of men to put a value on it, introduced (by consent) larger possessions, 
and a right to them” (Locke 23).  
 
  It is interesting to note that Locke connects the introduction of money to an explicit desire to 
evade the spoilage limitation and have more than necessity required, but he does not question the 
workings of the market, because it is labor which sets the new value of things.  This is crucial.  
Proprietary claims are no longer connected to the satisfaction of needs and the value of these essential 
things is no longer determined by their instrumental value.  Property, once described in terms of a 
positive natural right, something which is owed, becomes an issue for negative rights—that is, for 
restricting what can be done to someone.  Notice the implications of the switch.  In opting for 
limitless accumulation of property, we seem to have traded the right to that which sustains us for the 
protection of wealth, which is presumably that which we have earned through our labor.   
It is plain, that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the 
earth, they having, by a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may 
fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of, by receiving in 
exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to 
anyone; these metals not spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor (Locke 
29). 
 
There are at least two important assumptions here.  First there is the question of how wealth 
is acquired.  Labor is the basis upon which proprietary claims are made and the objects of claims 
given value.  It is essential to pay close attention to the ordering of details in the cases cited by Locke.  
For example, when Locke interposes the history of proprietary rights into the Bible, the properties 
which are eventually settled upon come about as boundaries set amongst existing territories.  These 
are negative rights, protecting existing wealth.  Having articulated the crucial differences between 
accumulated wealth and earned income, I take this to be a point worth noting.  Compared to the 
landless wage-earner, the landowner is not as reliant upon his labor or the value it is given by the 
market.  Yet Locke is not suggesting that each is owed land, but rather  seems to be saying that it is 
there for the taking. 
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Second, there is the assumption that the sustenance condition has been satisfied even before 
the switch to limitless pursuit of wants beyond needs.   Again, Cain and Abel are thriving on the fruits 
of their individual industries before anyone attempts to legitimize his claim.  Ironic that he mentions 
Cain and Abel, since we all know what happened when their different labors were differently valued.  
Does a similar chaos follow the fickle valuations of the market?  But, alas, Locke never seriously 
questions what happens in times of scarcity or how the person with no land or wealth can hope to 
acquire the means of sustenance when the value of his labor is not worth the value of scarce 
necessities.   
This state of affairs is one of the shortcomings of liberalism which continues to infect its 
application in our world.  It is a bias in favor of the fortunate, the wealthy capitalist, the colonialist 
and imperialist. The hegemony of neoliberal ideology only cemented imperialist hierarchies and 
elitism fostered by classical liberalism. Liberialism lessens its commitment to equal liberty and 
equality of opportunity in favor of policies enhancing property rights and modes of accumulation. The 
weakening of the capacities of developing states only mirrored the lack of capability afflicting the 
majority of the population, and extreme disparity in the standard of living available across the globe 
(but primarily North to South) have been rationalized in terms of the myth of the free market. Thus 
the liberty of persons in the developing world has been sacrificed in order to promote the liberty of 
capital. 
 The neoliberal agenda, calling for a limited role of government, is informed by a conception 
of liberty inherited from Hobbes.  Since liberty begins where the law ends, it is assumed that the 
sphere of government’s influence in the lives of persons should be limited to enforcing a rule of law 
providing for common security.  This is the purpose of the social contract, whereby persons agree to 
give up an uncertain but unlimited liberty for guaranteed but limited liberty.  The enjoyment of 
individual liberty, the pursuit of particular personal ends, takes place within this protected realm.  
Thus the liberty which the liberal seeks to maximize and protect is negative, a space circumscribed by 
the laws articulating the rights and opportunities available to free persons of equal moral standing.  
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Civil law essentially functions as a means of arranging diverse interests and aims so that they do not 
collide.  Without making judgments regarding the relative worth of these diverse ends, the liberal 
attempts to secure for each person sufficient space to realize his or her particular ends.   
 This negative conception of liberty guarantees for citizens certain negative rights, which 
make explicit not what each citizen can rightfully expect to receive from the state, but rather what the 
citizen can expect not to receive.  Negative rights articulate what cannot  be done to someone, and for 
the liberal this means that persons are thought to be free from undue interference in carrying out their 
own rational ends.  And this is how individual liberty is limited by the liberal state, for persons are 
free to pursue their own ends provided that they do not hinder or harm another in his or her pursuits.   
 For classical liberals like John Locke, this is where the obligation ends.  All we as members 
of civil society owe our fellow citizens is forbearance—that is, we must design and carry out our own 
pursuits so that they do not trample the natural and civil rights of others.   
Every one, as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so 
by like reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as 
much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it be to do 
justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what tends to the preservation 
of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or goods of another (Locke 9). 
 
 Within this passage there is lurking another dangerous assumption made on Locke’s part, one 
that has enormous consequences in application.  Locke apparently assumes that, left to their own 
devices, persons are capable of subsistence.  The “preservation of mankind” entails not that I supply 
that which is necessary for the life, health or liberty of another; Locke is not speaking of a positive 
right to basic necessities.  I am doing my duty merely by leaving him alone.  It is assumed, again, that 
basic necessities exist in great abundance, so that there is enough for everyone.  Thus it is possible for 
one to claim as much as he or she can use, while still leaving “enough, and as good, left in common 
for others” (Locke 19).  Why should anyone complain even when I take a good draught, if there is a 
river to quench the thirst of everyone else as well?   
 Now Locke admits that the introduction of money could induce a sort of “false” scarcity.  
There are still enough goods, someone has just bought them all.  But Locke tells us, in effect, that we 
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got what we asked for.  When we agreed to accept gold and silver in exchange for other goods, it was 
a conscious attempt to subvert the natural limitations on property.  We wanted the right to unlimited 
wealth, and thus we sacrificed not a small measure of security in our resources.  What we must accept 
with this bargain is that in this, as in any competition, there will be losers as well as winners.   
 And what, if anything, are the losers owed?  The winners’ obligations to the losers are 
restricted to forbearance.  And what can the losers expect from the state?  All the liberal is committed 
to guaranteeing is a fair race.  It is of the utmost importance that the civil laws and institutions be 
structured so as to ensure equal opportunities for all citizens.  But, again, the liberal assumes that, 
under the protection of negative rights, persons can fend for themselves, as it were.   
 This presumption of capability, however, has had dire consequences in the application of 
liberal theory to the real world.  Real people have suffered.  The crucial point I want to make about 
persons suffering destitution is that they have no liberty.  They are utterly lacking the competency 
which allows one to plan and pursue a life of one’s own choosing.  They may well have negative 
rights which guarantee negative liberty, but this notion is inadequate in describing the actual 
opportunities available to persons.  A negative conception of liberty cannot explain why a person who 
(let’s say) has been granted negative rights can still be without real liberty.  Regardless of the civil 
liberties granted by the state and the dutiful forbearance of fellow citizens, a person who cannot feed 
himself cannot be free.  The capacities which would go into the structuring of a meaningful course of 
life have been dramatically diminished. 
 What is needed is a positive conception of liberty, one which considers the actual capabilities 
of persons to pursue their own version of the good.  This would allow us to address the inadequacies 
regarding the actual opportunities that are not only “open” but are live options for actual persons.  For 
liberty cannot really be granted; instead, it is exercised.  Meaningful liberty—the only liberty that 
makes sense—is more fundamental, more basic than the civil liberties granted by the law.  It is 
primary, coming before the alternatives and options available through natural lottery or the silence of 
the law.  It is what makes particular opportunities live options; it is what makes choices in these 
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matters possible.  One’s actual liberty is not to be described as an empty space waiting to be filled but 
as the bundle of capacities and abilities with which one is able to construct a life.   
 There are those who are disadvantaged in life’s lottery.  Some suffer grave impairments and 
disabilities which make them unable to compete on a level footing with others who are more 
fortunate.  Is there to be no compensation for such factors?  In fact, contemporary liberals have indeed 
sought to remedy this injustice.  One of the most important contribution to distributive justice is John 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.  Rawls’ “justice as fairness” seeks to mitigate the influence of morally 
arbitrary factors, such as social contingencies and natural fortune, on the distribution of shares.  The 
ordering of civic and economic institutions is to follow from the principles of justice chosen from the 
“original position.”  Persons choose from behind a “veil of ignorance”—that is, they do not know the 
particulars of their own condition, their status, class, wealth, or natural assets.  From this hypothetical 
contract, Rawls believes that two principles would be chosen, ranked in serial order. 
First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
compatible with a similar liberty for others. 
Second: social and economic institutions are to be arranged so that they are both (a) 
reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage, and (b) attached to positions and 
offices open to all (Rawls 60). 
 
Complementing these principles is an Aristotelian theory of the good as “eudaimonia – happiness or 
flourishing” (Rawls 93).  Each individual is assumed to have drawn up a rational life plan, in 
accordance with the conditions he faces.  Persons will choose different ends for themselves, just as 
the conditions faced will vary.  Yet whatever the chosen ends may be, “they nevertheless all require 
for their execution certain primary goods, natural and social” (Rawls 93).  In broad categories, Rawls 
lists these primary goods as “rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth” 
(Rawls 92).  In judging a social system, it is not necessary to make an exhaustive interpersonal 
comparison of the goods each person has.  Rather, Rawls simplifies this comparison by identifying 
the least advantaged person.  It is this person whose benefits would presumably be maximized from 
the original position. The difference principle, embodied in the second principle of justice, “requires 
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that the higher expectations of those more advantaged contribute to the prospects of the least 
advantaged” (Rawls 95). 
 
 Although justice as fairness, with its concern for liberty and primary goods, appears to 
complement my own concerns outlined above, it does not accept my conception of positive liberty.  
Rawls writes: 
The inability to take advantage of one’s rights and opportunities as a result of poverty 
and ignorance, and a lack of means generally, is sometimes counted among the 
constraints definitive of liberty.  I shall not, however, say this, but rather I shall think 
of these things as affecting the worth of liberty, the value to individuals of the rights 
that the first principle defines (Rawls 204). 
 
In order to understand the difference between liberty and the worth of liberty, it may be helpful to 
continue quoting Rawls:  
“[L]iberty is represented by the complete system of the liberties of equal citizenship, 
while the worth of liberty to persons and groups is proportional to their capacity to 
advance their ends within the framework the system defines” (Rawls 204). 
   
Liberty as defined by equal citizenship is the same for everyone; this is not true of the worth of 
liberty, as some will find themselves with a greater and more effective means to achieve their ends.  
But Rawls contends that when the difference principle holds, this less than equal worth of liberty is 
compensated for, since the existing inequalities work to the advantage of the less fortunate. 
 It appears evident that the present economic system does not meet Rawls’ second principle of 
justice.  The United States is the wealthiest nation in the world, yet it is also the most unequal in 
terms of the distribution of that wealth.   
“During the decade [1980 to 1990], only the top quintile of US families gained while 
the rest experienced declines in income share” (Kim 1910).   
 
In 1989, 94 percent of the total financial wealth in the United States was concentrated 
in the hands of the top quintile.  The second quintile got nearly all the rest (Wolff 10).  
 
 The idea of justice as fairness demands that inequalities favoring the top work to the 
advantage of those at the bottom. Yet the key findings of the Tenth Annual CEO Compensation 
Survey, put out by United for a Fair Economy, projects a disturbing picture. Although the average 
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CEO pay declined from 2000 to 2002, it is nevertheless 282 times the average worker pay, nearly 
seven times the 1982 ratio of 42 to 1 (Anderson et. al. 21). Worse still, the Chief Executive Officers 
at firms where the welfare of wage workers was especially precarious was the highest compensation. 
CEOs at the 50 companies with the most layoffs in 2001 was pay increases of 44 percent between 
2001 and 2002, compared to an increase of only six percent for overall CEO pay. Top executives at 
the 30 companies with the largest deficits in their pension plans in 2002 were also rewarded, as their 
median pay was 59 percent higher than that of the average large company CEO. Median CEO pay 
over the period 2000 to 2002 at 24 Fortune 500 companies having the greatest number of offshore tax 
havens was 87 percent higher than median three-year pay for their counterparts at 365 corporations 
(Anderson et. al. 1).Thinkers and policymakers have long been aware of the possible ill effects of 
capitalism upon liberty.   
 “What a cruel reflection,” Thomas Jefferson wrote in his travel journal, “that a rich country 
cannot long be a free one” (Jefferson 63).  Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote with great zeal of the 
equality of condition he witnessed in the United States in the 1830s, asked incredulously, “Can it be 
believed that the democracy which has overthrown the feudal system and vanquished kings will 
retreat before tradesmen and capitalists?  Will it stop now that it has grown so strong and its 
adversaries so weak?  Whither, then, are we tending?” (Tocqueville 7)  Where, indeed? It appears that 
we are tending toward ever greater concentration of wealth, ever fewer restraints on the freedom of 
financial capital, and a corresponding constraint on the live options facing a great number of the 
world’s people.   
 Is this state of affairs indicative of a fatal human flaw which must be figured into the 
equation?  Must any attempt at egalitarianism lock horns with human avarice?  Che Guevara certainly 
saw his aim as a dual one, comprising not just the development of productive capacities but the 
development of a “new man” (Mesa-Lago 19, Eckstein 34).  In a crucial sense, equitable growth in 
Revolutionary Cuba depended upon the new man, who would behave differently than the economic 
man lauded by capitalism.    
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The tendency toward acquisition is the defining characteristic of the economic man, and so 
much the better for the liberal, for it greatly simplifies things.  His interest in the betterment of his 
condition makes the economic man predictable (Hirschman 49).  There is no need to decipher 
individual preferences, as these would be indicated through market mechanisms.  One’s preferences 
are exhibited through one’s purse, and one’s choices are distilled down to decisions over how it is 
spent.  The desire of increasing one’s purse is not what must be guarded against; rather, it becomes a 
fundamental part of liberty.  There is a long history of thought, infecting liberalism, by which vice is 
made  virtue.  Hobbes, for whom the state of nature was a vicious war, nevertheless relied upon a 
“countervailing strategy” to negotiate peace.  The Hobbesian Covenant “is concluded only because 
the ‘Desires, and other Passions of men,’ such as the aggressive pursuit of riches, glory, and 
dominion, are overcome by those other ‘passions that incline men to Peace,” which are ‘Feare [sic]of 
Death; Desire of such things as are necessary to commodious living; and a Hope by their Industry to 
obtain’” (Hirschman 31).  One can see versions of this argument echoed by contemporary 
economists.  John Maynard Keynes also pits passion against passion to ensure a peaceful 
arrangement: 
Dangerous human proclivities can be canalized into comparatively harmless channels 
by the existence of opportunity for money-making and private wealth, which, if they 
cannot be satisfied in this way, may find their outlet in cruelty, the reckless pursuit of 
personal power and authority, and other forms of self-aggrandizement.  It is better 
that a man should tyrannize over his bank balance than over his fellow citizens; and 
whilst the former is sometimes denounced as being but a means to the latter, 
sometimes at least it is an alternative (Keynes, in Hirschman 134). 
  
 International commerce has often been conceived as a similar countervailing strategy, 
whereby commercial interests tame the wilder passions for conquest.  Montesquieu writes that “the 
natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace.  Two nations that trade together become mutually 
dependent: if one has an interest in buying, the other has one in selling; and all unions are based on 
mutual needs” (quoted by Hirschman 80).  His friend Jean-Francois Melon declares: “The spirit of 
conquest and the spirit of commerce are mutually exclusive in a nation” (quoted by Hirschman 80).  
One hears the same sort of argument made with regard to globalization, whereby nations are united 
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by webs of interdependence.  I am reminded of Thomas Friedman’s “Golden Arches Theory—that no 
two countries that both have McDonald’s have ever fought a war against each other since they each 
got their McDonald’s” (Friedman, Foreward of The Lexus and the Olive Tree). 
 But what damage has this intense commercialization inflicted upon the individual?  The 
economic man yearns to rise above his role as a commodity, and does this primarily by consuming 
other commodities.  He is educated by the social myths and legacies lauding the triumphs of 
individuals over adversity, and his heroes are richly rewarded.  My own casual observations of 
college students reveal a pervasive admiration of Bill Gates, especially strong among those of lower-
middle to lower class origins.  College dropout becomes the richest person in the world.   That this 
makes an inspiring tale for struggling undergraduates is not hard to see, and many of the students 
indicated faith in the rags-to-riches fable.  Lottery advertising relies upon this faith, and it is no 
coincidence that billboards are to be found in lower-income areas.  Some billboards explicitly play up 
the lottery ticket as “the ticket out.” While critics of state lotteries have long been declaring them to 
be a tax on the poor, the very existence of state-run lotteries indicates an inherent difficulty facing the 
state’s delivery of social services.  More and more people are using these services, but they are less 
and less willing to pay taxes.  While there are certainly reasons to be distressed by the currently 
regressive tax structure in the United States, comparison with more egalitarian nations like Sweden or 
Norway, reveals U.S. taxation to be relatively low.  That these countries offer so much more in the 
way of social services gives reason to expect that along with positive social and economic rights 
come positive obligations for the state and its citizens—responsibilities that liberals have traditionally 
refused to accept.   
 It is for this reason that the alternative developmental strategies, which I will offer in the 
following section, will be presented as the means to reconcile the alleged trade-off that has pervaded 
liberal economic policy, between accumulation and redistribution, between policies which foster 
economic growth and those which benefit social welfare.  I will argue that enhancing the capabilities, 
of both individuals and nations, enhances the prospects for both of the liberal’s aims.  First, enhancing 
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the capabilities of persons augments the productive capacities of nations.  Thus redistributive efforts 
may increase the accumulation of human capital.  Second, enhancing the capabilities of persons 
means increasing their liberty to pursue their own ends.   
 The following section takes as its starting point a positive conception of liberty.  I argue that 
it is by means of this conception that the liberal is better able to realize his aims.  The chief end of 
development is not the enhancement of countries’ productive output, although the Cuban experience 
shows that this is necessary.  The primary goal of development is the enhancement of the capacities 
that go into human flourishing.  In the words of Amartya Sen, development means freedom.  This 
goes to the heart of the liberal project, and I hope to show the liberal a path to development which is 
more in line with this fundamental aim. 
CHAPTER 4 
“DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM” 
THE IMPLICATIONS OF POSITIVE LIBERTY  
 
 
 Amartya Sen has written the “Development can be seen . . . as a process of expanding the real 
freedom that people enjoy” (Sen 3). And what does Sen take to be obstacles to “development as 
freedom”?  
Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as 
tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic deprivation, neglect of 
public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of repressive states (Sen 3). 
 
I have tried to give voice to my concern that liberal market regimes do not adequately guarantee or 
sufficiently address the enjoyment of fundamental liberties. These fundamental liberties are prior to 
civil liberties secured under liberal democracies, and they are prior to considerations regarding the 
space allowed by the silence of the law and the forbearance of fellow citizens. They essentially 
describe primary, lowest-order volitions, capacities to effectively direct one’s own life. These are 
capacities which are fundamental to our conception of being human, central to the realm of human 
action. Any rational agent would desire this primary liberty, and it would appear that other subsequent 
liberties would presuppose this right. 
 The positive conception of liberty has important consequences for the ordering of civic and 
especially economic institutions in liberal democratic societies.  Liberals advocating a positive 
account of liberty will be much more critical of capitalist democracies than their negative libertarian 
counterparts, who assume that private property is the linchpin of individual liberty and the market the 
proper mechanism of distributive justice.   Positive liberty—at least the conception which I have 
outlined--assumes that all persons have a right to the basic primary goods required for healthy human 
functioning.  While it obviously cannot guarantee the success of individual pursuits, it regards the 
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development of the capabilities requisite to such pursuits as crucial to the enjoyment of meaningful 
individual liberty.   
  A list of the necessary primary goods would certainly include many of the goods taken to be 
priorities for liberal democracies, such as security and access to education, but many others would 
appear to be at odds with the distributional priorities of capitalist market economies.  The greatest 
priority for liberal market regimes is economic growth, and this determines the distributional scheme.  
According to classical economic growth models, sustained by the neoliberal agenda, growth in GNP 
is directly proportional to the national savings ratio.  This means that the savings rate, and not levels 
of consumption, is of greatest importance in assessing performance.  It also means that distribution is 
skewed toward the wealthy, as it is assumed that they, and not the wage workers, will accumulate the 
savings required for reinvestment in the economy. 
 But current focus on endogenous growth theories may offer fertile ground for human 
development strategies, as these theories emphasize the productivity-enhancing effects of 
improvements in domestic capital, especially human capital.   
 While it is true that John Rawls’s conception—even though it regards liberty in the negative 
sense—demands more than dutiful forbearance, I am concerned that the difference principle cannot 
do what Rawls intends it to do.  I have serious doubts that the inequalities allowed by the second 
principle of justice will actually impact the worth of liberty of the least advantaged.  Perhaps such 
inequalities may increase the formal opportunities of the less fortunate; but without enhanced 
capacities, how are the least advantaged to take advantage of them?  Even if offices and social 
positions are formally open to all, how can persons with deficient capacities actually compete for 
them?  And how do the benefits arising from the unequal distribution of primary goods impact the life 
plans available to the less fortunate?  These questions make the difference principle seem less a 
reordering of the rules of the contest than a package of consolation prizes for the losers. 
 Rawls’s negative conception of liberty allows him to focus on the fair distribution of 
primarily goods as the means of achieving egalitarian justice.  He deliberately sets his theory of 
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justice against conceptions which order society’s well-being along lines determined by principles of 
utility.  Classical utilitarianism classifies the good as “the satisfaction of rational desire.”  Thus a 
system established along these lines will allocate limited resources in order to maximize net 
satisfaction, without regard to what is right (Rawls 25).  Furthermore, such a society conceives of 
individuals as so many sockets into which goods may be plugged to achieve “the greatest fulfillment 
of wants.”  All persons are conflated into a single “impartial spectator,” who administers the weights 
accorded to the various desires.  Thus Rawls asserts, “Utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
distinction between persons” (Rawls 27). 
 The liberty to pursue individual advantage, rendered as personal “conceptions of the good,” is 
the priority of Rawls’s theory of justice, yet he seems to make the same assumptions as did Locke 
about the capabilities requisite to this freedom and autonomy. By what devices could the capacities of 
the least advantaged be enhanced?  How could we judge whether a system guarantees this result?  
This is a difficult issue for liberalism, for it is unwilling to make judgments regarding the worth of 
individual conceptions of the good.  Thus it would be difficult to make evaluations of a particular set 
of institutions on the basis of the satisfaction of individuals’ “rational desires.”  But is there another 
way of determining whether the liberty as capacity of persons is being enhanced?  Must we look to 
the effects or results of this capacity? 
 In Rawls’s scheme, this is not a necessity, since it is assumed that persons are rational agents 
who design their life plans in conformity with their given stock of primary goods.  I feel that this is 
not going far enough.  Here the development literature may provide a useful contribution to this issue.  
It is still possible to evaluate the primary capacities of persons without making judgments regarding 
their chosen ends or assuming capacity from the given set of primary goods.  The rather recent 
emphasis in the literature on human development provides indicators of the actual functioning of 
persons.  I have in mind indicators which evaluate the standard of living available, as well as literacy 
and numeracy, rates of employment, as well as income distribution.  Such indicators provide a 
snapshot of the actual level of functioning and the real options available.   
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 This is not to say that indicators describing persons’ access to basic goods such as safe water, 
sanitation, health care and education are to be ignored.  Indeed, these are an important part of the 
picture.  But, as Amartya Sen suggests, we must be careful in assuming that a given set of primary 
goods substantively translates into a given set of capabilities.  While a disabled person may have 
access to the same bundle of goods that a healthy person enjoys, the former is less able to make use of 
them.  Sen notes that Rawls requires that persons take responsibility for their preferences.  This 
means that if I am less than happy with the same bundle of goods enjoyed by others, I must take 
responsibility for my extravagant tastes (Sen 72).  But isn’t this picture altered if I am less than able 
to enjoy my stock of goods because of natural or social misfortune, through no choice nor fault of my 
own?  Does justice as fairness have any response to my inability to translate my primary goods into 
actual capacities?  This appears to be the case for millions of the world’s destitute.  How can any 
conception of justice permit such a state of affairs? 
 A serious appraisal of liberty which is more in line with justice must include the conceptual 
step leading to an appreciation of capacity.  Liberty is about being able to do things.  One of the 
capacities of primary importance—indeed, one could argue that it provides the meaning of life—is 
that of self-direction of one’s life, of designing a life project.  Granted, these life plans must 
correspond with certain contingencies that persons find in their particular circumstances.  But some 
contingencies should not be allowed to remain without compensation.  Rawls’s justice as fairness 
outlines some contingencies which are compensated in the name of equal opportunity.  Morally 
arbitrary factors are not to have a functional role in the distribution of primary goods.  Still, as I’ve 
pointed out, Rawls does not include poverty or destitution as a restriction of liberty or opportunities.  
Rawls’s account of the least advantaged representative person need not be the one who is struggling 
to survive because of deficiencies in income or health, but rather the one who has the smallest bundle 
of social goods that are the right of equal citizenship.  This scheme neglects consideration of crucial 
factors which limit the enjoyment of these primary goods and the exercise of liberty.  As a scheme 
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employing a negative conception of liberty, it also ignores a fundamental concern in the living of a 
meaningful and satisfying life. 
 What might a human development strategy look like?  I argue that “development with a 
human face” requires the assumption of a positive conception of liberty, through which positive social 
and economic rights guarantee persons the capability to take up individual life projects.  Although 
such a change in conception would require the reordering of social and economic institutions, most 
likely a difficult task politically, there are reasons to believe that human development might be 
packaged in such a way that it will complement the liberal’s economic concerns.  Thus I will refer to 
allocations to public health and education as investment in an overall strategy to enhance the 
accumulation of human capital. 
 Although it is experiencing renewed attention, the recognition of the value of human 
resources is not new.  In 1891, Joseph Shield Nicholson may have been the first to apply the term 
“living capital” (as opposed to physical, or “dead,” capital) when considering the wealth of countries.  
McCulloch in 1864 argued, “Instead, then, of being entirely overlooked, as is most frequently the 
case, the dexterity, skill, and intelligence of the mass of its inhabitants should be most particularly 
attended to in estimating the capital and productive capacities of a country” (Nerdrum 12-13). At the 
turn of the twentieth century, Alfred Marshall declared that “although nature is subject to diminishing 
returns, man is subject to increasing returns . . . Knowledge is our most powerful engine of production 
. . . .”  Likewise, the agricultural economist Theodore Shultz, accepting the Nobel Prize, emphasized 
the increasingly favorable returns of human capital investment in low-income countries.  In addition 
to the economic value of investing in health and education, he also stressed the beneficial effects in 
human development.  “The decisive factors of production in improving the welfare of poor people are 
not space, energy, and crop land; the decisive factor is the improvement in population quality” (Meier 
180).   
Human capital theory enjoyed a great deal of attention throughout the 1960s and 1970s.  Its 
appeal was renewed with the arrival of new endogenous growth theory and the intensified interest in 
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“development with a human face,” brought for the most part by the United Nations Development 
Programme’s first Human Development Report in 1990.  Echoing Joseph Nicholson’s and Alfred 
Marshall’s sentiments, the UNDP’s 1990 Human Development Report declared, “The real wealth of a 
nation is its people.” 
One of the greatest advantages to the investment in human capital is the degree to which 
various expenditures complement one another.  Take expenditure on primary health care as an 
example.  Greater investment in this area should improve the health of the poor.  The benefits of 
school lunch programs and maternal and child nutrition programs should increase as a result of the 
increased efficiency in transforming calories into improved nutrition.  In turn, improved nutrition 
should result in increased learning capacity, as well as higher rates of school attendance (Griffin and 
McKinley 5). 
There are also crucial complementarities between expenditures which improve the health of 
women and their education level, fertility, and life expectancy.  Keith Griffin and Terry McKinley 
also point out the linkages between literacy and health and between literacy and formal education and 
the productivity of the labor force.   
Whenever complementarities such as these occur, the components of expenditure 
programmes should not be viewed in isolation but rather as a single package.  That is, 
whenever complementarities are present, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts 
(Griffin and McKinley 5). 
 
Jere Behrman outlines other important linkages, emphasizing the positive association 
between initial schooling and real per capital GNP growth.  He finds that the growth rate increases by 
about 0.35 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean for every grade exceeding the level predicted 
by real per capital income (Behrman 22).  Initial schooling affects real per capita GNP growth 
through two crucial channels.  Each additional year of initial schooling is reported by Behrman to 
correspond to an increase in export growth by 0.7 percent per year, as well as a decrease in population 
growth by about 0.20 percent per year (Behrman 23). The transition to a human development strategy 
is likely to polarize the political climate.   
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There is an asymmetry during the transitional period: those who gained from 
conventional development strategies and can be expected to lose relatively and 
perhaps absolutely from a change of strategy are likely to constitute an articulate, 
well-organized and powerful opposition; the potential beneficiaries, in contrast, while 
numerically large, are likely to be less articulate, unorganized and politically less 
influential (Griffin and McKinley 36). 
 
Moreover, the support for human development programmes among the disadvantaged is based on the 
mere expectation of gain, which experience may have taught them to doubt, while the potential 
opposition is rather more certain of their losses.  Care must be taken in designing human development 
strategies to avoid opposition where possible as well as alienation of the middle sectors where losses 
and gains are going to be smaller (Griffin and McKinley 36). 
Yet even aside from the political necessity of building support for these strategies, the 
empowerment of people is a crucial part of human development.   
“Human development ultimately rests upon a vigorous civil society—a host of non-
governmental organizations that give people a voice and instruments for action—and 
in countries where civil society is weak, it should be a major purpose of public policy 
to invigorate it” (Griffin and McKinley 7-8).   
 
Participating in grassroots organizations can aid in the successful targeting of expenditure, 
identifying community needs and defining the content of development projects.  Relying on such 
organizations within civil society may also help to reduce costs by taking responsibility from central 
government, where costs tend to be higher (Griffin and McKinley 8). 
A few words are in order on the topic of decentralization, for it has maintained a prominent 
place in the development literature.  Its role from that position, however, deserves to be regarded with 
skepticism, for it has not generally served as a means to popular empowerment.  “Of neoliberal 
inspiration,” writes Haroldo Dilla Alfonso,  
It is included in the structural adjustment packages favored by the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international financial agencies.  From 
this perspective, decentralization is a process with a strong technocratic imprint, 
directed towards the achievement of higher efficiency through the use of de-
statization and the disintegration of social activity in the kingdom of privatization and 
free market (Dilla 178). 
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Decentralization employed in this manner can be detrimental to, if not antithetical to, the interests of 
human development.  The redistribution of power must be a devolution of power to the communities, 
rather than a tightening of oligarchic control.  Even successful popular mobilization campaigns may 
fail to represent any real assumption of power by the community, as often happens with single-issue 
collective action: victory means demobilization (Kaufman 14).    
Michael Kaufman helpfully cautions us to avoid Eurocentric models of social change and 
look instead toward indigenous experience.  The emphasis placed on the proletarianized workers and 
identity through the workplace ignores a more fundamental identification in developing countries.  
The people in need of empowerment, those long excluded, are the peasants, artisans, producers of 
crafts, and domestic laborers, whose lives are structured around community networks.  Further reason 
to concentrate on the community as a critical locus of change “is that it seems that it is at this level 
that ordinary people can best articulate a holistic concept of their needs” (Kaufman 10). 
Informed by the human capital approach and its potential to resolve the growth-redistribution 
dispute, several authors and policy advisors have advocated similar human development strategies.  
Inaugurated with the annunciation of the United Nations Development Programme’s emphasis on 
“Development with a Human Face,” such strategies regard the development of human capabilities as 
not only the chief end but also the key means toward development in the larger sense.  A crucial aim 
is on social spending, particularly on basic education, health and nutrition.  The returns on such 
expenditures exist for the individual, in terms of enhancement of capability and therefore of earning 
potential and of quality of life more generally, as well as for society, which benefits not only from 
increased productivity of the population but also from invigorated citizenship and social cohesion.  
Human capital spending is especially efficient as well, since the greatest returns are to be found in 
those areas which are relatively inexpensive, for example, primary education rather than universities 
and preventative health care versus curative technologies and procedures. 
Thus there appears to be great cost-effective potential in targeted human capital spending.  
This means that even the poorest developing countries can make use of these strategies.  A viable 
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strategy would necessarily include prenatal care, including check-ups as well as training and nutrition 
programs for mothers, oral rehydration therapy coupled with improved water supply and sanitation 
(which would tackle one of the greatest threats to public health and the biggest killer of infants and 
children—diarrheal illnesses),  immunization and basic drugs (Cornia 166-7, Sivard 32-35, Griffin 
and Knight 29).  Such programs are not only among the simplest and cheapest; they are also aimed at 
the most deadly threats in the developing world.  Most of the health hazards in the developing world 
are related to poverty.  Diseases stemming from unsafe or insufficient water supplies or carried by 
insects, food or water cause the suffering of almost half the world’s people (Sivard 32).  Malnutrition 
is the other threat in the developing world, particularly deficiency in protein, iron, iodine, and 
Vitamin A, causing not only starvation but also blindness, stunted growth, and reduced neurological 
capacity (Cornia 166).   
Supplements and food fortification can make great strides in dealing with such nutrient 
deficiencies.  But implementing a long-term solution to malnutrition runs into complex difficulties.  
People suffer malnutrition and hunger because they lack the resources either to grow enough food or 
to purchase food in the market.  A long-term solution must therefore be concerned with the ownership 
of assets, the most important being land, employment, and income distribution (Cornia 168).  These 
areas of policymaking, however, are politically-charged and resistant to change.  Thus combating 
malnutrition means waging a long and difficult war on the economic and political roots of poverty.   
Intermediate steps may be taken to relieve some of the worst symptoms.  For most countries, 
intervention comes in the form of food subsidies, targeted at those who are not reached by 
employment-based programmes, such as the young, the elderly, and pregnant mothers.  Many 
supplementary food programs are administered through schools and health centers, and monitoring 
health status and weight for age identifies the beneficiaries (Cornia 168).  According to Griffin and 
Knight, programmes targeted at persons whose earnings fall below an arbitrary minimum income 
level or whose food consumption is below an arbitrary caloric minimum are especially susceptible to 
corruption by those government officials who exercise discretion in these cases (34).  Moreover, as 
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Amartya Sen makes clear, contra Rawls, persons in different circumstances may not receive the same 
benefits from the same amount of basic resources.  For example, a sick or disabled person, with the 
same bundle of goods such as income or food, may not have the capacity to lead a normal life.  It 
would be wiser, then, to concentrate one’s evaluation on actual human functionings (Sen 1999: 74-5).  
Nevertheless, in the interest of providing targeted services less prone to corruption or abuse, free 
lunches in primary schools and rationed food available to those in rural areas would be preferable to 
income- or caloric-based schemes—or, worse, nothing at all.  To a great extent, these services would 
be self-selected by those in need (Griffin and Knight 34). 
Their scarcity of resources and faster-growing populations present developing countries with 
a trade-off escaped by richer industrialized nations in improving their education systems: quantity or 
quality.  While there has been progress in quantitative terms, the quality of education continues to 
suffer.  The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) puts one 
year of education in an industrialized country equal to three or four years of schooling for the average 
developing country (Oxenham 101-2).  The IEA found in its study that the shortfall in quality of 
education has roots in the quality of the learners who enter school.  “Differences in achievement 
among schools within countries were related to the qualities of the students entering the school: 
factors such as teaching methods or equipment played only a minor part” (Oxenham 104).  This 
interesting result has strong implications for human capital investment, drawing on many of the 
complementarities mentioned by Griffin and McKinley.  Poverty affects the quality of students not 
only through the direct costs of education; inattendance and high drop-out rates are the result of poor 
health and nutrition as well as the income of the family and its need for extra labor (Oxenham 106).  
But the quality of teachers is not unrelated.  A 1985 study by Medeiros found that 35 percent of 
Brazilian teachers lacked even minimal qualifications.  Fuller noted that a third of the teachers in the 
northeast region of Brazil had attended fewer than four years of primary school (Oxenham 110).  Part 
of the problem is the difficulty of attracting qualified individuals to the teaching profession.  The 
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maldistribution of teachers exacerbates the poor quality of rural and poor urban schools (Oxenham 
111).   
Griffin and McKinley note that “[i]n many developing countries budgetary allocations for the 
formal education system have the shape of an inverted pyramid in which secondary and tertiary 
education receive more than four times as much public resources as primary education” (39).  This 
expenditure structure “mirrors the stratification, privilege and discrimination against women and 
other groups which is characteristic of the society at large” (Griffin and McKinley 40).   
Implementing a human development strategy involves, first and foremost, a redirection of 
government spending toward human capital activities.  This change in social expenditure need not 
require swollen budgets and enormous bureaucracies.  It does require a change in priorities and 
reduction in spending that does not contribute to human development, such as military and security 
expenditures.  Human development strategy also requires that public spending benefit the greatest 
portion of the population.  Subsidies for public enterprises which cater to the upper classes, such as 
funding for airports or luxury hotels, should be minimized.  Investing in human capital thus provides 
a more equitable arrangement “more consistent with democratic aspirations.”  Expensive social  
programs such as welfare state provisions in western Europe should be avoided, and this means 
trimming some of the pension and social security schemes one finds in some developing countries in 
Latin America.  Although it involves allocations which benefit the broadest range of people, a human 
development strategy advocates selectivity where possible, in order to target those who are in need.  
But this is a thorny issue, since it is not always possible or even desirable in certain cases to impose 
discriminatory allocation of resources.  The administration of such allocations would indeed be 
costly.  In addition, it may be a political advantage to offer universal human development programs.  
(Griffin and McKinley 32-3).   
Yet the tax systems in most developing countries is less than optimal, and usually regressive 
as well.  Thus, rather than cutting advantageous services in the face of a lack of resources, it may be 
prudent to impose user charges to help cover the cost.  Of course, since these measures are to combat 
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prevailing inequalities, the user charges must be selective.  There should be no charge for services 
largely benefiting the poor, such as primary education and health care.  Services shared by the rich 
and poor, such as secondary education and non-basic health care, should be charged to users 
according to income.  University education, specialized medical procedures, and other services used 
primarily by upper-income groups should have full-cost charges, but the poor should be provided the 
means to enjoy these services through scholarships, for example, or example, or a merely nominal fee 
(Griffin and Knight 31-32). 
It may be possible to avoid negative political consequences of targeting services, as well as 
inaccuracy and unintended beneficiaries, by designing programmes that are attractive to the neediest 
portion of the population.  For instance, food-for-work programmes that are open to all will most 
likely appeal to the unemployed who suffer low caloric consumption and low incomes.  Self-selection 
of beneficiaries can also work to the advantage of food rationing schemes which offer basic essentials 
needed by low-income households, since everyone has access but upper-income groups will 
voluntarily opt for other sources (Griffin and Knight 35). 
I share with Amartya Sen the concern that development planning be directed at its proper 
goal.  “Development can be seen,” argued Sen, “as a process of expanding the real freedoms that 
people enjoy.”  Growth in terms of GNP or per capita income are only intermediary inputs in the 
development process, “important as means” to the expansion of real human freedoms (Sen 1999: 3).  
Thus much of the development planning and advising which has occurred seems to have been 
wrongheaded, often with devastating consequences.  Evident in Latin America is the case of the 
Brazilian “miracle” of 1968-1973, in which the Brazilian military (and its bureaucracy of technocrats) 
achieved one of the fastest rates of growth in the world.  Yet in 1974, even President Médici admitted, 
“The economy is doing well, but the people are doing poorly” (Sloan 232).   
The emergence of a recent new approach in the development literature echoes the experience 
of Brazil and several other Latin American countries and the tragic realization that despite impressive 
economic growth, the actual living conditions of the world’s people had shown no real improvement.  
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Disillusionment with the narrow conception of development as growth led to what Todaro (15) has 
called the “dethronement of GNP” as a sufficient indicator of development.  Sen’s ideas seem to have 
been vindicated, as development planners and advisors and not just academics working within the 
literature have admitted that blind faith in growth and its trickling down have resulted in “growth 
without development” (Coetzee and Ligthelm 182).   
Yet it is no accident that the recent trends to “development with a human face” bear 
resemblance to Sen’s notion of “development as freedom, as he has collaborated with the United 
Nations Development Programme in its formulation of a Human Development Index.  This index 
more closely monitors the actual functionings of persons, measuring life expectancy, adult literacy 
rate combined with education achievement in addition to per capita income. 
The HDI makes clear that high per capita incomes do not automatically translate into 
improved human functioning. It also testifies to the damage done to the population be demand 
suppression during structural adjustment. Many alternative strategies advocate attention to the supply-
side. But even here, we are cautioned not to assume that increased agricultural output automatically 
reduces hunger and deprivation. This reflects the common tendency to confuse supply with command 
(Sen 1990, 40). Even further, not only do the means of acquiring basic goods such as food vary 
among the population, but there is also variation in the enhancement of welfare and capability for a 
given bundle of goods. 
Malthusian predictions of population growth outrunning food output, according to Sen, have 
“not been vindicated by history.” However, from the other side of the coin, “Malthusian optimism”– 
that is, lack of concern, as long as food output increases along with, or faster than, the population–has 
led to a critical distortion in the prevalent approaches to hunger and famine. This, in turn, often results 
in inaction or misguided policy. While population growth most definitely presents a problem to be 
dealt with, and attention to agricultural output is crucial, the history of underdevelopment indicates a 
pervasive neglect of the problem of acquirement (Sen 1990, 35). 
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Case studies, including the Bengal famine of 1943, the Ethiopian famine of 1973, and the 
Bangladesh famine of 1974, provide examples of famine occurring where there was either no decline 
or even a slight increase in food availability per capita. There is thus great need to evaluate famine 
from a different perspective, in order to avoid delay or inaction. Sen advocates an “entitlement 
approach,” according to which, “the entitlement of a person stands for the set of different alternative 
commodity bundles that a person can acquire through the use of the various legal channels of 
acquirement open to someone in his position” (Sen 1990, 36). These bundles are acquired through 
either original ownership (“endowments”) of trade (“exchange entitlement mapping”), and hunger 
results from constriction of this entitlement set. 
A person is reduced to starvation if some change in his endowment (e.g. alienation of 
land, or loss of labor power due to ill health), or in his exchange entitlement mapping 
(e.g. fall in wages, rise in food prices, loss of employment, drop in the price of the 
goods he produces and sells), makes it no longer possible for him to acquire any 
commodity bundle with enough food (Sen 1990, 37) 
 
Much suffering and death has occurred in the developing world as a result of slow, 
misdirected, or failed policy reactions. I have mentioned some of the short-term and intermediate 
interventions which have been advocated to ameliorate poverty’s most immediate threats. Such 
policies rely not only upon external aid and favorable trade and investment, but also upon a capable 
state. The latest response on the part of the international financial institutions, loans and debt 
assistances conditional upon Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, has been praised for streamlining as 
well as mainstreaming states’ efforts to reduce poverty. Whereas formerly many such efforts were the 
domain of specialized agencies without command over budgetary allocation, poverty reduction now 
falls under the purview of the respective ministers of finance. 
There is reason to expect that successful food policy and long-term sustainability in poverty-
stricken Africa will include the enhancement of agricultural production. But Sen again cautions us to 
treat this as a simple matter of food supply, for it is also the primary source for the means of 
livelihood for a great proportion of African. “If the expansion of food production should receive full 
priority in Africa, the case for it lies primarily in the role of food production in generating 
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entitlements rather than only supply” (Sen 1990, 48-9). Not to be ignored, the prevalence of 
disastrous weather conditions, such as drought in Sub-Saharan Africa and hurricanes in Central 
America and the Caribbean, can make agricultural production uncertain and risky. Such difficulties 
obviously point to the necessity of diversification in production. 
I have argued that social expenditure by the stat is a key element in the enhancement of 
individual liberty and human development. Why the state and not the private sector? Why not smaller 
social entities like churches and communities? If it is the liberal stat’s task–its duty, and the very 
reason for its existence–to protect the life and liberty of persons, then it must guarantee certain 
positive social and economic rights necessary to human functioning. Civil and political rights granted 
by the state do nothing to ensure the capability of persons to take advantage of “equal” opportunities. 
The effort to develop countries, as to develop humans, does require attention to support networks 
existing in civil society, and there is much talk in the contemporary literature about involving 
communities in “globalization from below.” But my point is that there must be the commitment, as 
well as the wherewithal, on the part of the state, to guarantee its people not only the formal liberties of 
democratic institutions but also the effective primary liberty presupposed by the liberal project. This 
means that priorities must change, both in the national and international contexts to facilitate this 
capacity of the state. 
  
 58
WORKS CITED 
 
Aghion, Philippe, Eve Caroli and Cecilia Garcia Peñalosa.  “Inequality and Economic Growth: The 
Perspective of the New Growth Theories,”  Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37 
(December 1999), pp. 1615-1660. 
 
Agosin, Manuel R. and Ricardo Mayer, “Foreign Investment in Developing Countries: Does it Crowd 
in Domestic Investment?” UNCTAD Paper No. 146 (February 2000). 
 
Anderson, et. al. Tenth Annual CEO Compensation Survey, United For a Fair Economy. 
 
Baer, Werner.  The Brazilian Economy: Growth and Development, Fourth Edition.  Westpoint, 
Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 1995. 
 
Barr, Nicholas.  The Economics of the Welfare State, Fourth Edition.  Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004. 
 
Behrman, Jere R.  Human Resources in Latin America and the Caribbean.  Washington, D.C.: Inter-
American Development Bank, 1996. 
 
Bird, Graham.  The IMF and the Future: Issues and Options Facing the Fund.  London: Routledge, 
2003. 
 
Bornschier, Volker and Christopher Chase-Dunn, “Transnational Penetration and Economic Growth.”  
Published in Development and Under-Development: The Political Economy of Global 
Inequality.  Mitchell Seligson and John T. Passe-Smith, Editors.Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1998. 
 
Boswell, Terry and William J. Dixon.  “Dependency and Rebellion: A Cross-National Analysis.  
American Sociological Review, 1990. 55: 540-59.  Cited in Bornschier and Chase-Dunn, 
1998.  
 
Brecher, Jeremy.  “Global Village or Global Pillage?” The Nation, December 6, 1993. pp. 685-688. 
 
Breen, Richard and Cecilia Garcia-Peñalosa.  1998.  “Income Inequality and Macroeconomic 
Volatility: An Empirical Investigation,” cited in Aghion, et. al. (1999). 
 
Brundenius, Claes.  Revolutionary Cuba: The Challenge of Economic Growth with Equity.  Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
 
Care, Norman.  On Sharing Fate.  Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1987. 
 
Clayton, Richard and Jonas Pontusson.  “Welfare State Retrenchment Revisited: Entitlement Cuts, 
Public Sector Restructuring and Inegalitarian Trends in Advanced Capitalist Societies,” 
World Politics 51.1 (1998) pp. 67-98. 
 
Coetzee, Stef. F. and Andre A. Ligthelm.  “The Evolution of Development Theories and Regional 
Development Theories.”  Published in Development is For People, edited by Jan K. Coetzee.  
Johannesburg: Manmillan South Africa Publishers, Ltd., 1986. 
 59
 
Cornia, Giovanni Andrea.  “Investing in Human Resources: Health, Nutrition and Development for 
the 1990s.”  Published in Human Development and the International Development Strategy 
for the 1990s, edited by Keith Griffin and John Knight.  Macmillan Publishers, in association 
with the United Nations, 1989. 
 
De Tocqueville, Alexis.  Democracy in America.  New York: The Modern Library, 1945. 
 
Del Aguila, Juan.  Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution.  Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984. 
 
Dilla Alfonso, Haroldo.  “The Cuban Experiment,” Latin American Perspectives.  v. 27 Issue 1, 
January 2000. 
 
Donnelly, Jack.  Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1989. 
 
Dos Santos, Theotonio. “ The Structure of Dependence.”  Published in Seligson and Passe-Smith, 
1998. 
 
Eckstein, Susan Eva.  Back From the Future: Cuba Under Castro.  Princeton University Press, 1994. 
 
Esping-Anderson, Gosta.  The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism.  Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Ferreira, Francisco.  June 1999.  “Inequality and Economic Performance: A Brief Overview to 
Theories of Growth and Distribution,” at www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequality/index.htm. 
 
Firebaugh, Glenn.  “Growth Effects of Foreign and Domestic Investment.”  Published in Seligson and 
Passe-Smith, 1998. 
 
Friedman, Thomas L.  The Lexus and the Olive Tree.  New York: Anchor Books,  
 gatesfoundation.org 
 
Gibbon, Peter and Lau Schulpen.  “Comparative Appraisal of Multilateral and Bilateral Approaches 
to Financing Private Sector Development in Developing Countries.”  UN/WIDER Discussion 
Paper No. 2002/112. 
 
Griffin, Keith and John Knight.  Human Development and the International Development Strategy for 
the 1990s.  Macmillan Publishers, 1989. 
 
Griffin, Keith and Terry McKinley.  Implementing a Human Development Strategy.  New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1994. 
 
Harrington, Michael.  The Vast Majority: A Journey to the World’s Poor.  New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1977. 
 
Haussmann, Ricardo and Michael Gavin. 1996.  “Securing Stability and Growth in a Shock-Prone 
Region: The Policy Challenges for Latin America,” cited in Aghion, et. al., 1999. 
 
Hirschman, Albert O.  The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its 
Triumph.  Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton university Press, 1977. 
 60
 
Hoekman, Bernard, C. Michalopoulos and D. Tarr.  “Trade Policy,” at PovertyNet 
(www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/chapters/trade/trade.htm). 
 
Ikhide, Sylvanus.  “Institutional Reforms and the Role of Multilateral Aid Agencies.”  UN/WIDER 
Discussion Paper No. 2002/119. 
 
Huber, Evelyne and John D. Stephens. Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and 
Policies in Global Markets, University of Chicago Press, 2001 
 
Jimoh, Ayodele.  “Bilateral Official Finance of Private Sector Development and the Role of Non-
governmental Organizations.”  UN/WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2002/117. 
 
Kaufman, Michael.  “Community Power, Grassroots Democracy, and the Transformation of Social 
Life.”  Published in Community Power and Grassroots Democracy: the Transformation of 
Social Life, edited by Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla Alfonso.  London: Zed Books and 
Ottawa: The International Development Research Centre, 1997. 
 
Locke, John.  Second Treatise of Government.  C.B. Macpherson, editor.  Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, Inc., 1980. 
 
London, Bruce.  1987.  “Structural Determinants of Third World Urban Change: An Ecological and 
Political Economic Analysis,” cited by Glenn Firebaugh in Seligson and Passe-Smith, 1998. 
 
London, Bruce and Bruce A. Williams.  1988.  “Multinational Corporate Penetration, Protest, and 
Basic Needs Provision in Non-Core Nations: A Cross-National Analysis,” cited by Firebaugh 
in Seligson and Passe-Smith, 1998. 
 
Maddison, Angus and Associates.  The Political Economy of Poverty, Equity, and Growth: Brazil and 
Mexico.  Published for the World Bank by Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Meier, David.  Emerging from Poverty: the Economics that Really Matter.  New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1984. 
 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo.  The Economy of Socialist Cuba: A Two-Decade Appraisal.  Albuquerque: 
University of New Mexico Press, 1981. 
 
Morrissey, Oliver.  “Recipient Governments’ Willingness and Ability to Meet Aid Conditionality: the 
Effectiveness of Aid Finance and Conditions,” WIDER/UN Discussion Paper No. 2002/105. 
 
Nerdrun, Lars.  The Economics of Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis Illustrated Empirically by 
Norwegian Data.  Oslo, Norway: Scandanavian University Press, 1999. 
 
Oxenham, John with Jocelyn DeJong and Steven Treagust.  “Improving the Quality of Education in 
Developing Countries.”  Published in Griffin and Knight, 1989. 
 
Perotti, Roberto. 1992.  “Fiscal Policy, Income Distribution, and Growth,” cited in Aghion, et. al., 
1999. 
 
Perotti, Roberto.  1996.  “Growth, Income Distribution, and Democracy: What the Data Say,” cited in 
Aghion, et. al., 1999. 
 61
 
Rawls, John.  A Theory of Justice.  Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. 
 
Renner, Michael.  “The Global Divide: Socioeconomic Disparities and International Security.”  
Published in World Security: Challenges for a New Century, Third Edition.  Michael T. Klare 
and Yogesh Chandrani, editors.  New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998. 
 
Sen, Amartya.  Development as Freedom.  New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999. 
 
Silverman, Bertram, Editor.  Man and Socialism in Cuba: The Great Debate.  New York: Atheneum, 
1971. 
 
Sivard, Ruth Leger (with Arlette Brauer, Lora Lumpe and Paul Walker).  World Military and Social 
Expenditures 1996, Sixteenth Edition.  World Priorities, 1996. 
 
Sloan, John W.  Public Policy in Latin America: A Comparative Study.  University of Pittsburgh 
Press, 1984. 
 
Stephens, John D., Evelyne Huber and Leonard Ray.   “The Welfare State in Hard Times.”  Published 
in Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism.  Kitschelt, Herbert, Peter Lange, 
Gary Marks and John D. Stephens, Editors.  Cambridge University Press, 1999. 
 
Tendler, Judith.  “Safety Nets and Service Delivery: What are Social Funds Really Telling Us?”  
Published in Social Development in Latin America: The Politics of Reform, edited by Joseph 
S. Tulchin and Allison M. Garland.  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. 
 
Todaro, Michael P.  Economic Development, Fifth Edition.  New York: Longman, 1994. 
 
United Nations Development Programme.  Human Development Report 1998. 
 
UNDP.   Human Development Report 1999. 
 
UNDP.  Human Development Report 2000. 
 
Valenzuela, J. Samuel and Arturo Valenzuela.  “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative 
Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment.”  Published in Seligson and 
Passe-Smith, 1998. 
 
White, Howard.  “Long-run Trends and Recent Developments in Official Assistance from Donor 
Countries.”  WIDER/UN Discussion Paper No. 2002/106. 
 
Wimberley, Dale W.  1990.  “Investment Dependence and Alternative Explanations of Third World 
Mortality: A Cross-National Study,” cited by Firebaugh in Seligson and Passe-Smith, 1998. 
 
Wimberley, Dale W.  1991.  “Transnational Corporate Investment and Food Consumption in the 
Third World: A Cross-National Analysis,” cited by Firebaugh in Seligson and Passe-Smith, 
1998. 
 
Wodon, Quentin and Shlomo Yitzhaki, for the World Bank, at PovertyNet at 
www.worldbank.org/poverty. 
 
 62
www.devdata.worldbank.org 
 
www.icftu.org 
 
www.madeinmexico.com 
 
www.un.org 
 
www.unhchr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm 
 
www.wallstreetview.com 
 
www.worldbank.org/poverty/data/trends/inequal.htm 
 
